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MARKETING AUTHORIZATION AT THE
FDA: PARADIGMS AND ALTERNATIVES
ADAM I. MUCHMORE *
In many critical industries, the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) marketing
authorization decisions determine the range of products available in the United States. Because
of the broad scope of the FDA’s marketing authorization responsibilities, the existing scholarship
focuses on individual product categories, or small groups of product categories, regulated by the
Agency. This Article identifies how the existing literature overlooks important connections
between the FDA’s different marketing authorization programs. These connections suggest both
explanations for existing programs and strategies for potential reforms.
The Article sets forth a two-level framework for analyzing the FDA’s marketing
authorization role. At the first level, the framework divides the FDA’s marketing authorization
programs into three components: pathways, designations, and means of access before marketing
authorization. At the second level, the framework distinguishes between two types of pathways,
three types of designations, and four means of access before marketing authorization. This
framework gives a coherent intellectual structure to a sprawling set of regulatory programs that
are otherwise difficult to analyze. Based on this framework, the Article makes several
analytical contributions specific to food and drug regulation.
The Article’s final contribution highlights a newly identified phenomenon, interchangeablepart lawmaking (IPL), that should be of broader interest. IPL takes place when a government
entity takes a portion of its law in one subject area and uses it as a model for its own law in
another subject area. It is strikingly visible in the statutes administered by the FDA, but IPL
likely exists in statutes more generally. IPL has substantial implications for statutory
interpretation, as well as for numerous strands of academic literature.

* Professor of Law, Penn State Law; Research Affiliate, Penn State Center for Health
Care and Policy Research. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the Sixth Annual
Health Law Works-in-Progress Retreat at Seton Hall and at a faculty workshop at Penn State
Law. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Valarie Blake, Carl Coleman,
Katrice Bridges Copeland, Lewis Grossman, Ben Johnson, Julia Lee, Jud Mathews, Hari
Osofsky, Stephen Ostroff, Jordan Paradise, James Puckett, Dara Purvis, Steve Ross, Mare
Sarr, David Simon, Mark Storslee, Dan Walters, Sam Wiseman, Megan Wright, and Samson
Wu. For excellent research assistance, I thank Kelson Crawford, Gabrielle Delanois, May
Lee, Ileana Polanco Cavazos, and Cori Smith. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is one of the core public
health agencies in the United States. It administers a $6 billion annual
budget and is charged with regulating industries that, together, comprise a
large segment of the U.S. economy.1 The FDA’s highest profile activity is its
marketing authorization role.2 In many industries—such as drugs, medical
1. See AGATA BODIE & AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44576, THE FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA) BUDGET: FACT SHEET 2, 4, 8 (2021) (describing total enacted
fiscal-year 2021 budget, including both congressional appropriations and congressionally
approved user fees). For fiscal year 2023, the Biden Administration has proposed an increase of
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) annual budget to over $8 billion. See U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2023 BUDGET IN BRIEF 18–19 (2022).
2. As in the author’s prior work, this Article uses “the term marketing authorization to refer
generally to all processes by which [the FDA] permits products to be marketed in the United
States.” See ADAM I. MUCHMORE, FOOD AND DRUG REGULATION: A STATUTORY APPROACH 81
(2021). Congress, the FDA, and other academics have at times used the term in a similar sense.
See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) § 802, 21 U.S.C. § 382(b) (use by
Congress); 21 C.F.R. pt. 801 (use by the FDA); Sam F. Halabi, The Drug Repurposing Ecosystem:
Intellectual Property Incentives, Market Exclusivity, and the Future of “New” Medicines, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH.
1, 46, 53 (2018) (use by other academics). This Article prefers marketing authorization rather than
the catchier term “gatekeeping” because of the specific meaning the latter term has come to have
in the legal literature. Professor Reinier Kraakman used the term “gatekeeper liability” to describe
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devices, and biological products—the FDA is the primary agency charged
with determining which of those products may be sold in the United States.3
Because of the broad scope of the FDA’s marketing authorization
responsibilities, most existing scholarship focuses on individual product
categories, or small groups of product categories, regulated by the FDA.
There is no existing agency-wide analysis of the FDA’s marketing
authorization programs. This is, in part, because the language and
conceptual structure necessary for such an analysis does not yet exist. This
Article begins to fill that gap.4 In the process, it demonstrates that the siloed
nature of existing scholarship misses important connections between the
FDA’s various marketing authorization programs.5
This Article presents the FDA’s marketing authorization activities through
a two-level framework.6 At the first level, the framework divides the FDA’s
marketing authorization programs into three components: pathways,
designations, and means of access before marketing authorization. At the
second level, the framework distinguishes between two types of pathways
(paradigm and alternate),7 three types of designations (review clock,
“liability imposed on private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their
cooperation from wrongdoers.” Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986). A substantial literature analyzing the
role of private sector “gatekeepers” has developed from Professor Kraakman’s article. See, e.g.,
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2006). While the FDA is a gatekeeper in the colloquial sense of the term, it is—as a public
agency—not the type of private individual or entity associated with the term “gatekeeper” in
the academic legal literature. Nonetheless, the term gatekeeping is used in many important
analyses of the FDA’s marketing authorization role, particularly outside of the legal academy.
See, e.g., DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010).
3. See What Does FDA Regulate?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2022),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-basics/what-does-fda-regulate (providing examples for
the areas the FDA regulates and the overlap with other agencies).
4. See infra Part I.
5. See infra Parts II.A–D.
6. An earlier version of this framework is set out, for pedagogical purposes, in
MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 93–139. This Article revises the framework, presents it in a twolevel format, and demonstrates that it has substantial analytical value. Parts I, III, and the
Conclusion of this Article do not overlap in any way with the casebook. While there is some
overlapping language in Part I, the content is substantially revised. Of the figures presented
in this Article, only Figure 3 (Pathways), included as Appendix A, is a modification of a figure
presented in the casebook. All other figures are original to this Article.
7. The reference to “alternatives” in the title of this Article is to alternatives to the
paradigm pathway. These alternatives include alternate pathways, designations, and means of
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application assistance, and market exclusivity), and four means of access
before marketing authorization (standard investigational use, expanded
access, emergency use, and right-to-try access). This framework makes it
possible to step back from the details of each marketing authorization
program to view the FDA’s marketing authorization activities as a whole.
The FDA’s most high-profile activity is its marketing authorization role. It is
a role the FDA exercises most prominently with respect to medical products,
such as drugs, devices, and biologics.8 However, the FDA also has a marketing
authorization role with respect to other product categories, such as food
additives, color additives, and tobacco products.9 There are other FDAregulated product categories for which no marketing authorization is required.10
The FDA’s various marketing authorization activities are typically
considered separate and highly specific to each product category.11 This is
access before marketing authorization. This is the reason for the difference between the use
of the word “alternative” in the title and the phrase “alternate pathway” in the framework
itself. See infra Part II.B, and especially Figure 2.
8. See M UCHMORE , supra note 2, at 97–107 (discussing pathways to market for
therapeutic products).
9. See id. at 107–13 (discussing pathways to market for non-therapeutic products).
10. See id. at 113–14 (discussing product categories for which no marketing authorization
is required). Product categories for which the FDA, by statute, has no general marketing
authorization role include food, cosmetics, dietary supplements, and radiation-emitting
consumer products. The FDA has, by regulation, eliminated any agency marketing
authorization role for over-the-counter (OTC) drugs compliant with an OTC drug
monograph (a regulation setting out permitted active and inactive ingredient combinations)
and for certain low-risk medical devices. The FDA has not sought to exercise any marketing
authorization authority over those human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products
(which the agency refers to as HCT/Ps) that are not also subject to regulation as “drugs,
biologics, devices, or combination products.” Id.
This absence of a marketing authorization requirement is itself significant. Regulated
parties and the FDA frequently dispute whether particular products are properly placed in
no-marketing-authorization categories (such as food, cosmetics, or dietary supplements) or
authorization-required categories (commonly food additives, drugs, or combination products).
See, e.g., United States v. An Article . . . Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734, 742 (2d Cir. 1969)
(concluding that an anti-wrinkle cream marketed with certain claims was a drug rather than
a cosmetic); U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Warning Letter to Lifetech Resources (Apr. 18, 2011),
https://www.fdalabelcompliance.com/letters/ucm251951 (warning the company that its
eyelash and eyebrow growth products, marketed as cosmetics, were also unapproved drugs).
11. This is particularly apparent in treatises and teaching materials. See, e.g., FOOD AND
DRUG LAW AND REGULATION (David G. Adams, Richard M. Cooper, Martin J. Hahn &
Jonathan S. Kahan eds., 3d ed. 2015) (presenting each marketing authorization process as a
component of a regulatory scheme for an individual product category); A PRACTICAL GUIDE
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the first article to present a broad framework for analysis of the FDA’s
marketing authorization processes across product categories.
This
framework sheds new light on these activities by highlighting the way a wide
range of the FDA’s marketing authorization activities are built up from a
more limited set of basic parts.12
Existing literature has analyzed marketing authorization for many FDAregulated product categories in detail. The literature is extensive with respect
to drugs,13 biologics,14 and medical devices.15 Similar literature exists, but in

TO FDA’S FOOD AND DRUG REGULATION (Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 5th ed.
2014) (similar); PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD
AND DRUG LAW (4th ed. 2014) (similar). One casebook, Lars Noah’s LAW, MEDICINE, AND
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2022), makes some effort to discuss
processes across some medical product categories (primarily drugs, biologics, and devices).
This includes a chapter devoted to “Development and Testing of Experimental Therapies”
and a chapter devoted to “Premarket Approval and Postmarket Surveillance.” Id. at 187, 291;
see also infra notes 13–30 and accompanying text (discussing literature on marketing
authorization for individual product categories).
12. See infra Part II (discussing interchangeable-part lawmaking (IPL)).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT
REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2006); SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION
OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE 1962 AMENDMENTS (1974) (contending that the
introduction of drug efficacy regulation harms drug consumers more than it helps them,
because of the degree to which efficacy regulation slows the introduction of new, effective
drugs). Industry-oriented publications focused on the mechanics of the drug marketing
authorization process also exist. See, e.g., BRINGING YOUR PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG TO
MARKET (Neil P. Dispirito, Ralph F. Hall & Matthew J. Hill eds., 2015). On the development
of the concept of bioequivalence used today in the marketing authorization process for generic
drugs, see Daniel Carpenter & Dominique A. Tobbell, Bioequivalence: The Regulatory Career of a
Pharmaceutical Concept, 85 BULL. HIST. MEDICINE 93 (2011). For an in-depth historical analysis
of therapeutic choice in America that addresses, but goes beyond, the FDA’s marketing
authorization role, see LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, CHOOSE YOUR MEDICINE: FREEDOM OF
THERAPEUTIC CHOICE IN AMERICA (2021).
14. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski & Erika Lietzan, FDA Regulation of Biosimilars, in FDA IN
THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES
414 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 2015); Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman,
Understanding and Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (2012); Henry Grabowski, Genia
Long & Richard Mortimer, Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and Policy Issues, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 511 (2011).
15. See, e.g., FRED H. DEGNAN, FDA’S CREATIVE APPLICATION OF THE LAW: NOT
MERELY A COLLECTION OF WORDS, 113–28 (2d. ed. 2006); James O’Reilly, “Left to Our Own
Devices, What Did We Get Wrong?” The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 as Seen from the Insider’s
View, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 110 (2019); Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Alan M.
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less volume, with respect to animal drugs,16 combination products,17 and
human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products (HCT/Ps).18
There is also some work seeking to evaluate the FDA’s marketing
authorization processes for medical products more generally.19 Other work
has focused on the relationship between the FDA’s marketing authorization
decisions and state law tort claims,20 the various expedited pathways
Kirschenbaum, The Standard of Evidence Required for Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605 (1992); Benjamin A. Goldberger, The Evolution
of Substantial Equivalence in FDA’s Premarket Review of Medical Devices, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 317
(2001); Jonathan S. Kahan, Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notification: Different Routes to the
Same Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 510 (1984).
16. See, e.g., Eugene I. Lambert, The Reformation of Animal Drug Law: The Impact of 1996, 52
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 277 (1997).
17. See, e.g., George Horvath, Emergent Regulatory Systems and Their Challenges: The Case of
Combination Medical Products, 94 WASH. L. REV. 1697 (2019) (analyzing marketing authorization
process for combination products).
18. Richard A. Merrill, Human Tissues and Reproductive Cloning: New Technologies Challenge
FDA, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2002) (exploring the FDA’s initial decision to regulate
human tissue neither as a drug nor a device, but instead as a separate product category
developed by regulation rather than statute). Today, under a revised regulatory program, the
relevant product category is not human tissue but human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissuebased products (HCT/Ps). Some of these HCT/Ps are regulated solely as HCT/Ps, see 21
C.F.R. § 1271.10 (2005), but the regulatory structure explicitly contemplates that some
HCT/Ps will also be regulated as drugs, devices, biologics, or combination products. See
Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration
and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5456–57 (Jan. 19, 2001).
19. For a review of empirical literature on the costs and benefits of the FDA’s regulation
of drugs, biologics, and medical devices, see Anup Malani & Tomas J. Philipson, The Regulation
of Medical Products, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF THE
BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2 (Patricia M. Danzon & Sean Nicholson eds., 2012)
(seeking “to shed light on whether the policies of the agency itself are safe and effective when
measured in terms of economic efficiency”). For a discussion of the FDA’s role in marketing
authorization for non-therapeutic uses of drugs and devices, see Patricia J. Zettler, The FDA’s
Power Over Non-Therapeutic Uses of Drugs and Devices, 78 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 379 (2021).
20. For some prominent examples, see Daniel E. Troy, The Case for FDA Preemption, in
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS (Richard A. Epstein &
Michael S. Greve eds., 2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Field Preemption: Opening the ‘Gates of Escape’
from Tort Law, 50 J. LEGAL STUD. S27 (2021); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption,
110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012); Richard A. Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption of State Laws in
Drugs Cases, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 463 (2009) [hereinafter Epstein, The Case for Field Preemption];
Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and
a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. 5 (2006) [hereinafter Epstein, Why the FDA Must
Preempt]; see also George Horvath, supra note 17, at 1702 (suggesting that, for medical
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available for medical products,21 the relationship between expedited
pathways and the various designations,22 the relationship between the FDA’s
products, FDA marketing authorization decisions and U.S. Supreme Court preemption
decisions may operate as an emergent system).
21. See, e.g., GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 162–96 (discussing the role of AIDS activists in
pressuring the FDA to develop accelerated approval pathway); Jordan Paradise, Three Framings of
“Faster” at the FDA and the Federal Right to Try, 11 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 53 (2020) (discussing
the relationship between previously-established expedited pathways for medical products and
the federal Right to Try Act); Thomas J. Hwang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Leveraging Novel and
Existing Pathways To Approve New Therapeutics to Treat Serious Drug-Resistant Infections, 42 AM. J.L. &
MED. 429 (2016) (analyzing pathways for products to treat drug-resistant infections).
22. See, e.g., Erika Lietzan, Access Before Evidence and the Price of the FDA’s New Drug
Authorities, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1243, 1308 (2019) (arguing that the “true cost” of requiring
approval for new drugs is the “period of monopoly pricing” associated with new-drug
approvals); Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 93–
103 (2016) (exploring the relationship between data exclusivity periods and the available
pathways for both small-molecule drugs and biologics).
There is a particularly extensive body of writing on priority review. While the FDA’s
priority review process developed in negotiations between industry and the FDA, see Priority
Review, FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast-trackbreakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-review/priority-review, the transferable
priority review voucher was the result of congressional implementation of an academic
proposal. The original proposal was David B. Ridley, Henry G. Grabowski & Jeffrey L. Moe,
Developing Drugs for Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 313, 313 (2006); see also David Ridley,
Home, PRIORITY REV. VOUCHERS, https://sites.fuqua.duke.edu/priorityreviewvoucher/ (last
visited Aug. 16, 2022) (providing a brief summary of the relationship between the academic
proposal and the statute). Professor Ridley and colleagues have continued to publish on the
economics of priority review vouchers. See, e.g., David B. Ridley, Pranav Ganapathy &
Hannah E. Kettler, US Tropical Disease Priority Review Vouchers: Lessons in Promoting Drug
Development and Access, 40 HEALTH AFFS. 1243 (2021). This high-profile program has itself
generated substantial literature. See, e.g., Oulu Wang, Buying and Selling Prioritized Regulatory
Review: The Market for Priority Review Vouchers as Quasi-Intellectual Property, 73 FOOD & DRUG. L.J.
383, 383 (2018) (analyzing “the priority review vouchers that have been issued, transferred,
and redeemed to date”). A broad theme of this literature is the question of whether the
transferable priority review voucher program is effective in achieving its goals.
In support of the program, see, for example, Andrew S. Robertson, Preserving an Incentive
for Global Health R&D: The Priority Review Voucher Secondary Market, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 524, 541
(2016), which analyzes the secondary market in priority review vouchers and suggests that there
may be diminishing returns to aggressive expansion of the program. For one criticism of the
program, see, Jonathan J. Darrow, Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, When Markets Fail:
Patents and Infectious Disease Products, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 361, 375–76 (2018), which questions
the efficacy of the priority review voucher program, at least for purposes of incentivizing products
for the treatment or prevention of infectious diseases. For another criticism, see Ana Santos

ALR 74.3_MUCHMORE_539-594.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

546

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW

9/8/2022 4:46 PM

[74:3

marketing authorization decisions and Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services coverage decisions,23 the processes for authorizing new uses of
already-marketed products,24 the various means of access to medical products
before marketing authorization,25 and the relationship between marketing
authorization pathways for drugs and medical devices.26 Separately, there is
Rutschman, The Priority Review Voucher Program at the FDA: From Neglected Tropical Diseases to the 21st
Century Cures Act, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 71, 98 (2017), which suggests that “the efficacy of the
program is questionable,” and notes several potential harmful effects.
23. See, e.g., GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 257–82 (discussing the ways that coverage
decisions by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and private insurers impact
real-world ability to choose medical treatments); Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102
MINN. L. REV. 2307 (2018) (discussing proposals to delink, for drugs, CMS coverage decisions,
and FDA marketing authorization decisions); Bruce Patsner, Marketing Approval Versus Cost of New
Medical Technologies in the Era of Comparative Effectiveness: CMS, Not FDA, Will Be The Primary Player, 3
J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 38 (2010) (suggesting that for medical products, FDA marketing
authorization decisions may soon be overshadowed by CMS coverage decisions).
24. See, e.g., Halabi, supra note 2, at 10–11 (suggesting that a “drug repurposing
ecosystem” exists and functions quite well, contributing consistently to the development of
new uses for existing drugs); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 717 (2005) (exploring the relationship between patent law, market
exclusivity, and trade secrecy in reducing developer incentives to seek approval of new uses
for drugs already on the market). On the broader regulatory challenges posed by technologies
that may continue to develop after marketing begins, see Rachel E. Sachs, Regulating Intermediate
Technologies, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 219 (2018).
25. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 162–200 (discussing the role of AIDS activists in
pressuring the FDA to speed access to unapproved drugs); Paradise, supra note 21 (discussing
the relationship between previously established means of access before marketing
authorization and the Federal Right to Try Act).
26. Professor Richard Merrill has compared the “architecture” of the FDA’s regulatory
process for drugs and medical devices. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government
Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996). In that article, Professor Merrill
traced the development of two models of marketing authorization for FDA-regulated medical
products. The first, the “New Drug Approval Model,” applies to the regulation of drugs and
biologics. Id. at 1757–58. Under the new drug model, the FDA must give its affirmative
assent at numerous steps throughout the process of developing a new product. Id. at 1797–
98. If competing priorities or resource constraints delay FDA action, the drug developer must
wait to proceed until the agency chooses to assent. Id. at 1798.
This contrasts with a separate “Medical Device Model” that applied—at the time—only
to medical devices. Id. at 1800. Today, a similar model applies to tobacco products as well. See
infra notes 174–177 and accompanying text. In Professor Merrill’s view, both Congress and the
FDA deliberately sought to develop a method of medical device regulation that was not based
on the new-drug model. Merrill, supra, at 1800, 1812, 1821. Instead, they sought to develop “a
new type of regulatory statute, one that would assure careful review of the few high-risk
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some writing on the marketing authorization processes for food additives27 and
color additives,28 some discussion of the relationship between categories that
require marketing authorization and those that do not,29 and a growing
literature on marketing authorization processes for tobacco-products.30
technologies but permit less intrusive, less costly regulation for most devices.” Id. at 1808.
For another perspective on the relationship between pathways for drugs and devices,
see Horvath, supra note 17, at 1727–39, which uses the increasingly prominent
combination-product category to explore this relationship.
27. See, e.g., Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food
Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L. R EV. 329 (1998) (noting delays in the approval of new
food additives and proposing various reforms).
28. Writing explicitly focused on color additives is relatively rare. For one recent
example, see Brenda Seidman, The Grays of Medical Device Color Additives, 69 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
491 (2014). Marketing authorization for color additives is addressed most frequently within
more general discussions of carcinogen regulation at the FDA. See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill,
FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation
to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 9–10, 36–48 (1988) (discussing FDA marketing
authorization decisions—and related litigation—involving color additives); Margaret
Gilhooley, Plain Meaning, Absurd Results and the Legislative Purpose: The Interpretation of the Delaney
Clause, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 267, 275–77, 294–96 (1988) (same).
29. Lewis A. Grossman, Food, Drugs, and Droods: A Historical Consideration of Definitions and
Categories in American Food and Drug Law, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1091, 1092–94; 1147–48 (2008)
(discussing the relationship between food, drugs, and dietary supplements, and suggesting a
thought experiment combining all three into a single category, “droods”); Lewis A. Grossman,
FDA and the Rise of the Empowered Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 627 (2014) (discussing rise of
social movements reacting to decisions either to decline to grant marketing authorization
for, or to remove existing marketing authorization for, certain drugs, food additives, and
products that would today qualify as dietary supplements).
30. See, e.g., Eric N. Lindblom, The Tobacco Control Act's PMTA & MRTP Provisions Mean
To Protect the USA from Any New Tobacco Products that Will Not Reduce Health Harms–But FDA Isn't
Cooperating, 23 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 121 (2021) (criticizing certain FDA marketing
authorization decisions with respect to tobacco products); Desmond Jenson, Ten Years of FDA
Tobacco Regulation: Lessons For Public Health Stakeholders, 40 J. LEGAL MED. 335, 345–48 (2020)
(criticizing the FDA’s failure to use its marketing authorization authority more aggressively
against e-cigarettes); Eric N. Lindblom, What is “Appropriate for the Protection of the Public Health”
Under the U.S. Tobacco Control Act?, 74 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 523 (2019) (arguing that the statutory
marketing authorization standard for tobacco products requires FDA to exclude consideration
of non-health impacts of its marketing authorization decisions); Desmond Jenson, Joelle Lester
& Micah L. Berman, FDA’s Misplaced Priorities: Premarket Review Under the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, 25 TOBACCO CONTROL 246 (2016) (criticizing numerous aspects of
FDA’s approach to marketing authorization for tobacco products); see also Lars Noah &
Barbara A. Noah, Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA’s Effort to Regulate Tobacco Products,
48 ALA. L. R EV. 1 (1996) (discussing earlier, unsuccessful FDA effort to regulate cigarettes
as combination products).
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The framework developed here makes four primary contributions. First,
the framework provides a basic terminology based on functional
characteristics of the relevant pathways, designations, and means of access
before marketing authorization.31 This functional terminology permits types
of cross-category analysis that are otherwise difficult to express. It also
emphasizes the distinct role of each aspect of the framework.32
Second, the framework suggests that the “paradigms and alternatives”
structure that can be seen at the FDA has developed, in part, to manage the
tradeoff between Type I and Type II error in the FDA’s marketing
authorization decisions.33 The paradigm pathways are focused on reducing
the risk of Type I error (which occurs when the FDA permits marketing of a
product that should have been kept off the market). The three sets of
“alternatives” to the paradigm pathway (alternate pathways, designations,
and means of access before marketing authorization) each function in the
regulatory program as a means of reducing the risk of Type II error (which
occurs when the FDA keeps a product off the market when it should have
permitted marketing of the product). They each address different potential
causes of Type II error. And they each do this in a manner that largely avoids
tinkering with the standard applied in the relevant paradigm pathway.
Third, the framework suggests that there are substantive consequences to
assigning particular government functions to one agency rather than another.34
Cross-category analysis reveals striking similarities in the structure of programs
used by the FDA to administer marketing authorization for highly disparate
product categories. This suggests that a congressional decision to assign a
particular function to the FDA will have consequences both for the way
Congress structures the program and the way the Agency implements the
program. A similar program assigned to the Federal Trade Commission, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or the Environmental Protection
Agency is likely to be both structured differently by Congress and implemented
differently by the agency to which it is assigned. This has implications for
discussions of potential macro-level changes to the FDA’s structure. It may also
have some value in analyzing the programs of the FDA’s foreign counterparts—
some of which have very different macro-level structures.
Fourth, the framework highlights a previously overlooked phenomenon
that is visible in the historical development of the FDA’s marketing
authorization programs.35 This phenomenon, which the Article terms
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Part II.
These distinct roles are often blurred in the FDA’s public communications. See infra note 90.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
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“interchangeable-part lawmaking” (IPL), occurs when a government takes a
portion of its law in one subject area and uses it as a model for its own law in
another subject area.36 It is, in other words, the legal analogue to the
interchangeable-part manufacturing process. IPL is strikingly visible (once one
begins to look for it) in the statutes administered by the FDA. But it also likely
exists in statutes administered by other federal, state, and foreign government
agencies. IPL has substantial implications for statutory interpretation, as well
as for numerous strands of academic literature. Relevant literature includes
recent work on the role of agencies in statutory drafting, on empirical analysis
of legislative text, and on path dependence in government institutions.37
This Article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, Part I presents
the framework. Part I.A discusses pathways to market and introduces a new
distinction between paradigm pathways and alternate pathways. A paradigm
pathway requires the FDA to determine that the product meets the most
rigorous version of the requirement the applicable statutes and regulations set
for marketing authorization. Alternate pathways are processes by which a
product can receive marketing authorization without following the paradigm
pathway. There is one—and only one—paradigm pathway for each product
category subject to marketing authorization. Some product categories have
multiple alternate pathways while others have none.
Part I.B presents a related concept currently applicable only to certain
medical products: the designations. These are not pathways to market, but
methods developed by Congress38 and the FDA to encourage the development
of, and grant of marketing authorization for, favored medical products. This
36. In an excellent study published shortly before this Article went to press, Jennifer Nou
and Julian Nyarko address a related phenomenon they term “regulatory diffusion.” See Jennifer
Nou & Julia Nyarko, Regulatory Diffusion, 74 STAN. L. REV. 897, 897 (2022) (describing “regulatory
diffusion” as occurring “when an agency adopts a substantially similar rule to that of another
agency”). Their large-dataset analysis examines situations where federal agencies borrow text
from regulations promulgated by other federal agencies. Id. From this Article’s perspective,
regulatory diffusion is one form of IPL. However, there are other forms as well. For example,
as Part II.D. demonstrates, Congress has repeatedly used existing programs as interchangeable
parts for new programs administered by a single agency, the FDA. In other words, Congress
has used existing programs as interchangeable parts in situations that do not involve diffusion.
37. IPL may also provide some perspective on the phenomenon social scientists describe
as institutional isomorphism. See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV.
147 (1983) (setting out the concept); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS (Paul DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell eds., 1991) (presenting essays analyzing
institutional isomorphism in various organizational fields).
38. When discussing statute-making, this Article uses the word “Congress” as shorthand for the
process of bicameralism and presentment required by the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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Part groups these designations into three categories for analysis: review clock
designations, application assistance designations, and market exclusivity
designations. Part I.C discusses four means of access before marketing
authorization. The first is standard investigational use, the process used to
provide limited access for the research necessary to provide data for the FDA
to review. The second is expanded access, a set of programs to provide access
to investigational products to those who are not research subjects. The third
is emergency use, a process by which the FDA can authorize emergency use
of unapproved products in response to declared emergencies. The fourth is
right-to-try access, a recent statutory innovation that sets out circumstances
under which a drug sponsor may choose—without FDA involvement—to
provide an investigational drug, for treatment use, to an individual patient.
Part II sets out four contributions of the framework presented in Part I. Part
II.A addresses the concrete benefits of a functional terminology for analysis of
the FDA’s marketing authorization programs. Part II.B suggests that the
“paradigms and alternatives” structure that can be seen at the FDA has
developed, in part, to manage the tradeoff between Type I and Type II error in
the FDA’s marketing authorization decisions. Part II.C suggests that there are
substantive consequences to assigning particular government functions to one
agency rather than another. Part II.D suggests that IPL provides a useful
perspective on the FDA’s marketing authorization programs. Then the Article
concludes.
I.

THE FRAMEWORK

This Part presents a two-level framework for analysis of the FDA’s
marketing authorization programs.39 It begins with an overview of five types
39. The framework presented here is one way to organize analysis of the FDA’s marketing
authorization programs, but it is not the only way. The author thanks Lewis Grossman for
suggesting a different approach built around the “mode of review” applicable to each marketing
authorization decision. Under such an approach, marketing authorization decisions can be
divided into three broad categories: approval, notification, and self-determination. First, there
are approval programs where marketing authorization requires an affirmative decision by the
FDA to grant such authorization. Second, there are notification programs where marketing
authorization can take effect without affirmative FDA action, such as following some specified
time period after the FDA receives (and declines to challenge) a notification to the agency. Third,
there are situations where marketing is authorized based solely on a regulated entity’s selfdetermination that background regulatory requirements—such as prohibitions on adulteration
and misbranding—are satisfied (without any requirement that the FDA be notified in advance).
This mode of review approach highlights aspects of the marketing authorization process that are
different from those emphasized by the framework presented in this Article. It suggests, in
particular, a way of analyzing the interaction between resource constraints, agency priorities,
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of marketing authorization standards administered by the FDA. It then
presents the framework itself. At the first level, the FDA’s marketing
authorization programs are composed of pathways, designations, and means
of access before marketing authorization.
At a second level, each of these three concepts has several subdivisions.
For pathways, there are paradigm pathways and alternate pathways. For
designations, there are review clock designations, application assistance
designations, and market exclusivity designations. For means of access
before marketing authorization, there is standard investigational use,
expanded access, emergency use authorization, and right-to-try access.40
The framework is summarized in Figure 1, immediately below.
FIGURE 1:
THE FRAMEWORK
Paradigm
Alternate
Designations
Review clock
Application assistance
Market exclusivity
Means of Access Before Marketing
Standard investigational use
Authorization
Expanded access
Emergency use
Right to Try access
Pathways

and the structure of marketing authorization programs. Space constraints prevent further
development of these issues here, but they suggest important topics for future work.
40. Some readers have asked about the role of post-market requirements, such as Risk
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) and post-approval study requirements, in the
framework presented in this Article. The framework presented here conceptualizes post-market
requirements as background regulatory requirements that apply to certain products after marketing
authorization is granted. They function in a manner similar to background requirements such as
establishment-registration requirements and the standard prohibitions on adulteration and
misbranding. See generally MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 141–63 (discussing background
requirements). Some post-market requirements are tied to marketing authorization because they
may be required as part of the marketing authorization process. A prominent example is postapproval study requirements for drugs and biologics that receive marketing authorization through
accelerated approval. But, under the framework presented here, there does not appear to be a
reason to treat these post-approval study requirements in a manner different from other
requirements imposed as part of the FDA’s marketing authorization decisions.
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The FDA requires marketing authorization for drugs, biologics, devices,
food additives, color additives, animal drugs, and tobacco products. There
are other products subject to FDA jurisdiction for which no marketing
authorization is required.41 At a broad level, it is useful to think of five basic
marketing authorization regimes enforced by the FDA. 42 Four of these are
marketing authorization standards;43 the fifth is the absence of a marketing
authorization requirement. These regimes are safety only; safety and
efficacy; safe, pure, and potent; protection of the public health; and no
marketing authorization required. At this broad level, the standard for
food and color additives is safety; the standard for drugs and devices is
safety and efficacy;44 the standard for biologics is safety, purity, and
potency; and the standard for tobacco products is protection of the public
health. No marketing authorization required is the standard for food,
dietary supplements, cosmetics, radiation-emitting products, and those
HCT/Ps that are not also regulated in another product category. 45
41. These include foods, cosmetics, dietary supplements, radiation-emitting products,
and those HCT/Ps regulated solely under § 361 of the Public Health Services Act (PHSA), 42
U.S.C. § 264. See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 113–14. Those products are regulated instead
under the FDA’s post-market authorities, such as prohibitions on adulteration, prohibitions
on misbranding, and establishment registration requirements. See id. at 141–63.
42. Here, a note on terminology is in order. The FDA uses a variety of terms to describe the
processes by which it permits a particular product to be marketed in the United States. These terms
have developed over time and are not always used consistently. The FDA is a large organization. Its
written materials develop gradually over time, with different officials choosing to emphasize different
distinctions between the various marketing authorization processes. For some materials, such as those
produced through notice-and-comment rulemaking, the agency cannot easily change them—even to
clarify terminology—without undergoing an extensive legal process. Moreover, the fact that some
products are regulated in more than one category creates additional terminological complications.
Roughly speaking, however, the FDA’s current use of these terms is as follows. Some
products are formally approved (new drugs), listed (color additives), or licensed (biologics). These
terms denote a finding by the FDA that the relevant product meets the applicable standard of
safety and (where applicable) efficacy. Medical devices can be either approved or cleared—with
the former reserved for products that undergo a more rigorous review process (premarket
approval), and the latter used for products that undergo a less rigorous review process (premarket
notification). Tobacco products receive marketing orders. Other products, such as many
substances added to food, are permitted on the market based on a determination that
they are exempt from the FFDCA’s definition of food additive. Some animal drugs are
conditionally approved, and some animal drugs are indexed as explicitly unapproved
products that are nonetheless permitted to be marketed.
For a recent FDA consumer update discussing the difference between those
marketing authorization decisions the FDA considers to be “approval” and those it does not,
see Is It Really 'FDA Approved'?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 10, 2022),
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However, these broad distinctions break down when looking closely at
the actual statutory language and implementing regulatory requirements.
As set out in more detail in the next section, most product categories
involve more than one potential pathway to marketing authorization,
with only the paradigm pathway involving a determination that the most
rigorous version of the relevant standard is satisfied. 46
A. Pathways
The first main component of the framework consists of pathways to
market. A pathway to market is a process by which the FDA grants
marketing authorization. The framework divides pathways to market for
FDA-regulated products into two broad sets: paradigm pathways and alternate
pathways. Paradigm pathways are the archetype for the relevant product

https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/it-really-fda-approved.
43. While there are five basic marketing authorization standards, there are two which
operate in a fairly, but not entirely, parallel manner. These are the “safety and efficacy”
standard applicable to drugs, and the “safe, pure, and potent” standard applicable to biologics.
For a combination of historical and statutory reasons, the FDA regulates biologics both as
“drugs” under FFDCA, § 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321 and “biological product[s]” under PHSA,
§ 351(i), 42 U.S.C. § 262(i). See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 97–98. Over time, this has
developed into a situation where roughly parallel pathways exist for both drugs and biologics.
44. However, the standard of safety and efficacy required for drugs is higher than the
standard of safety and efficacy required for devices. Compare FFDCA § 505(d), 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(d) (requiring safety and “substantial evidence” of efficacy), with FFDCA § 515(d)(2), 21
U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (requiring only “reasonable assurance” of safety and efficacy).
45. Authorization is required, however, for certain label claims for food and dietary
supplements. As these products can be marketed without the specific label claims in question
(and many were marketed before label claims for food were allowed, and before dietary
supplements were a separate product category), the framework set out in this Article does not
treat the label claim authorization process to be a form of marketing authorization. Excluding
label claim authorization from the framework is perhaps somewhat arbitrary, as its intended
uses—usually set out as label claims—are the core reason many products qualify as “drugs” or
“devices,” rather than articles that fall outside of FDA jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this Article takes
the position that drawing a sharp line between marketing authorization processes (for the
product categories addressed in this framework) and claim-authorization processes (for alreadymarketable food and dietary supplements) captures something important about the FDA role
with respect to the products and industries involved. For further discussion of these claimsauthorization processes, see infra Part II. A chart of these processes is included as Appendix D.
Additionally, the FDA has determined by regulation not to subject a subset of drugs
and medical devices to marketing authorization. These are certain OTC drugs and certain
low-risk medical devices. See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 114.
46. See infra Part I.A.
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category. Each paradigm pathway requires a determination by the FDA that
the product meets the most rigorous version of the requirement the
applicable statutes and regulations set for marketing authorization.
However, they are not necessarily the typical pathway used. For some
product categories, marketing authorization occurs far more frequently
through one or more alternate pathways.
Alternate pathways are processes by which a product can receive
marketing authorization without following the paradigm pathway. Most
alternate pathways do not formally alter the requirement applicable to the
relevant product category. Instead, they permit the requirement to be
satisfied in one of five different ways. First, an alternate pathway may permit
marketing authorization based on data held by the FDA that the applicant
neither owns nor has a right to access.47 Second, an alternate pathway may
permit marketing authorization based on establishing some specified degree
of similarity to a product already on the market (through either marketing
authorization or grandfathering).48 Third, an alternate pathway may permit
marketing authorization based on some endpoint (roughly speaking, a
measurable study target) other than the ultimate clinical outcome in the full
population of potential users.49 Fourth, an alternate pathway may permit
marketing authorization by exempting a product from regulation under the
seemingly applicable category.50 Fifth, an alternate pathway may formally alter
the marketing authorization standard applicable to the paradigm pathway.51
47. This type of alternate pathway is available for drugs and is known as a § 505(b)(2)
application. See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 99.
48. This type of alternate pathway, involving similarity to a product already on the
market, is available for generic drugs, generic animal drugs, biosimilar biological products,
interchangeable biological products, substantially equivalent medical devices, and
substantially equivalent tobacco products. See id. at 99–100, 102–03, 112–13.
49. This type of alternate pathway is, of course, only relevant to product categories for which
the paradigm pathway requires proof of efficacy in humans. These stand-ins include proof of
efficacy at satisfying a surrogate endpoint (an endpoint other than clinical efficacy, but reasonably
likely to predict clinical efficacy) in humans, proof of efficacy on some clinical endpoint other than
irreversible morbidity or mortality, proof of efficacy in animals, or proof of safety and efficacy (via
a favorable risk–benefit ratio) in a limited subpopulation of potential users. See id. at 100–01.
50. The first form of this type of alternate pathway, exemption from the product category
itself, is available for certain substances added to food. This pathway leads to exemption from the
food additive definition. It is used for substances generally recognized as safe (GRAS) and
substances in food-contact articles that fall below the threshold of regulation. See id. at 109–10. The
second form of this type of alternate pathway is available for OTC drugs subject to a monograph
and for medical devices exempted from premarket notification requirements. See id. at 103–05.
51. Two types of formal alteration in the applicable standard exist. The first is based on the
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In addition to products that receive marketing authorization through existing
paradigm and alternate pathways, there are also products that received
marketing authorization through either a former pathway or a grandfathering
provision.52 “A former pathway is a pathway that once existed but is no longer
available.”53 In many cases, some products approved through these former
pathways (when they were available) continue to have marketing authorization,
even though those former pathways no longer exist.54
A grandfathering provision is a statutory or regulatory provision providing
that certain existing products can continue to be marketed—despite a
significant change in the applicable regulatory regime—unless or until that
product’s authorization is explicitly revoked by statute or regulation.55
limited size of the product’s potential market. This type of formal alteration in the applicable standard
is available for medical devices, see id. at 106 (describing humanitarian device exemption), and animal
drugs, see id. at 106–07 (describing conditional approval and indexing). The second type of formal
alteration in the applicable standard is based on a congressional decision to deem a subset of products
(at this point, only certain medical gases) “to be approved” once they go through a limited certification
process administered by the FDA. See generally FFDCA § 576, 21 U.S.C. § 60ddd-1 (setting out this
alternate pathway); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CERTIFICATION
PROCESS FOR DESIGNATED MEDICAL GASES (2015) (describing how FDA intends to implement this
certification process). For a congressional testimony on the issues that appear to have led to Congress’s
decision to create this alternate pathway for medical gases, see generally FDA User Fees 2012: Issues
Related to Accelerated Approval, Medical Gas, Antibiotic Development, and Downstream Pharmaceutical Supply Chain:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 40 (2012)
(statement of Rep. Leonard Lance, Member, H. Subcomm. on Health); id. at 86–92 (statement of
Michael Walsh, speaking on behalf of the Compressed Gas Association). Congress passed the medicalgas provisions of the FFDCA less than four months after hearing this testimony. See Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, §§ 111–13, 126 Stat. 993, 1108–12
(2012) (enacting provisions providing for medical gas certification).
52. MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 95.
53. Id.
54. “An example is the GRAS affirmation process for food additives. This pathway has
been replaced by the GRAS notification process, but—unless explicitly withdrawn by FDA—
individual affirmations made through the former pathway remain valid.” Id.
55. “Typically, these provisions are structured to be a temporary part of a transition to a new
regulatory regime. They generally apply either to products explicitly approved under a prior
regulatory regime or to products lawfully marketed in the United States prior to a particular date.
Despite their structure as transitional provisions, many products remain on the market under a
grandfathering provision for decades. Product categories with important grandfathering provisions
still relevant today include food additives (prior-sanctioned substances), medical devices (products
on market prior to May 28, 1976), HCT/Ps (human tissue recovered prior to May 25, 2005), and
tobacco products (products on market prior to February 15, 2007).” See id. at 95.
FDA has at times made efforts to reduce the backlog of unapproved products marketed
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For a chart summarizing the pathways to market administered by the
FDA, see Appendix A.
B. Designations
The second main component of the framework consists of
designations.56 No designation provides a pathway to marketing
authorization.57 However, for products proceeding via certain marketing
authorization pathways, a designation can lead to substantial advantages
during or after the marketing authorization process. 58 Each designation
applies only to a subset of products in one or more product categories.59
Currently, designations are available only for certain products in the

in reliance on these grandfathering provisions. For a recent effort with respect to drugs,
see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR FDA STAFF AND I NDUSTRY: M ARKETED
UNAPPROVED DRUGS—COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE (2011) (updating 2006 guidance
document on the same topic). FDA abandoned this policy in 2020 after determining that
the policy had led to shortages and price increases for certain drugs. See Termination of the
Food and Drug Administration’s Unapproved Drugs Initiative; Request for Information Regarding Drugs
Potentially Generally Recognized as Safe and Effective, 85 Fed. Reg. 75,331 (Nov. 25, 2020)
(announcing the FDA’s decision to abandon its Unapproved Drugs Initiative and
withdraw the associated guidance document); see also Ravi Gupta, Sanket S. Dhruva, Erin
R. Fox & Joseph S. Ross, The FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative: An Observational Study of the
Consequences for Drug Prices and Shortages in the United States, 23 J. M ANAGED CARE &
S PECIALTY PHARMACY 1066 (2017) (describing the study highlighted by the FDA in
support of its decision to terminate the Unapproved Drugs Initiative).
56. The FFDCA also uses the term “designation” in one manner that is different from the
others discussed in this Part. The use is specific to medical gases, a subcategory of drugs limited to
certain drugs administered in gaseous form. See FFDCA § 575(2); 21 U.S.C. § 360ddd(2). The
FFDCA lists seven specific medical gases as “designated medical gases.” FFDCA § 575(1); 21
U.S.C. § 360ddd(1). It also permits the Secretary of Health and Human Services to add other
medical gases to this list of “designated medical gases” by administrative action. See id. This
designation is applied by statute or administrative action to a specific product (a medical gas
composed of a certain chemical or combination of chemicals), rather than to an application for
marketing authorization. It accordingly operates differently than the other designations addressed
by this Article, despite the use of the same statutory term. The two primary effects of inclusion on
this list of “designated medical gases” are to require marketing authorization for certain medical gases
(many of which were previously treated as grandfathered products) and to serve as a trigger for an
alternate pathway making such marketing authorization much easier to obtain. See supra note 51.
57. MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 115.
58. Id. One way to envision designations is as “flags that can be attached to a particular
application to have it treated more advantageously by FDA.” Id.
59. For a chart setting out these designations and the product categories to which they
can apply, see infra Appendix B.
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drug, biologic, device, combination product, and animal drug categories. 60
The framework presented here divides these designations into three
types: review clock designations, application assistance designations, and
market-exclusivity designations.61 The first type, review clock designations,
provide for a commitment by the FDA to try to issue a complete response
to a marketing authorization request more rapidly than it would for a
typical product.62 The second type, application assistance designations,
provide for FDA assistance in navigating the relevant marketing
authorization pathway.63 The third type, market exclusivity designations,
provide for an award—a period of market exclusivity for the approved
60. See infra Appendix B.
61. See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 115–22 (discussing the three designation types in
more detail). This Article treats as designations only those policy mechanisms that are
described with the word “designation” in the relevant statutes, regulations, or FDA documents
implementing the relevant program. (For an explanation of the reasons this Article does not
treat “designated medical gases” as falling within this group of “designations,” see supra note
56). Accordingly, it omits some mechanisms which operate in a similar manner to those
described here. These fall into two groups.
First, there are several exclusivity periods that the FDA does not describe as designations.
These include: (1) new drug product exclusivity (which includes both five-year exclusivity for new
chemical entities and three-year exclusivity for new clinical investigations), see generally 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.108 (setting out regulations); see also Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions for New
Drug Product Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/dru
gs/cder-small-business-industry-assistance-sbia/small-business-assistance-frequently-asked-questio
ns-new-drug-product-exclusivity, (2) 180-day exclusivity for generic drugs that succeed in
challenging the patent for a pioneer drug, see generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY WHEN MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY
2–3 (2003) (describing the statutory framework for 180-day exclusivity); see also Erika Lietzan & Julia
Post, The Law of 180-Day Exclusivity, 71 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 327 (2016) (providing detailed analysis
of past law, current law, and court decisions on 180-day exclusivity), and (3) pediatric exclusivity for
testing certain drugs in pediatric populations in response to an FDA request for such studies, see
generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: QUALIFYING FOR PEDIATRIC
EXCLUSIVITY UNDER SECTION 505A OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT 2–3
(1999) (providing an overview of the statutory requirements).
Second, several statutory provisions now explicitly provide for the grant of transferrable
priority review vouchers for use on a future application. See generally MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at
116 n.35 (citing relevant statutory provisions). Like market exclusivity designations, statutory
provisions providing for priority review vouchers offer an award as an incentive for a successful
application. But this award takes the form of a highly valuable voucher rather than an exclusivity
period. On priority review vouchers more generally, see supra note 22.
62. See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 115–16 (discussing review clock designations).
63. See id. at 117–19 (discussing application assistance designations but describing them
as “review assistance designations”).
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product—as an incentive for a successful application. 64
There is currently only one review clock designation: priority review.65 There
are four application assistance designations: fast track, breakthrough therapy,
breakthrough device, and regenerative medicine advanced therapy.66 There are
four market-exclusivity designations: orphan drug designation, qualified
infectious disease product designation, competitive generic therapy designation,
and designated new animal drugs for minor use and minor species.67
For a chart summarizing the designations administered by the FDA,
see Appendix B.
C. Means of Access Before Marketing Authorization
The third main component of the framework consists of means of
access before marketing authorization. These are ways of providing
limited access to a product before marketing authorization. The
framework presented here divides these means of access before marketing
authorization into four types: standard investigational use, expanded
access, emergency use, and right-to-try access.68 The first, standard
investigational use, 69 is the traditional process used to permit the research
required to obtain the data necessary for requesting that the FDA grant
marketing authorization. Standard investigational use is applicable to all
product categories requiring marketing authorization. The second,
expanded access, provides for patient access to investigational products
outside of the research context. This process, often described as
compassionate use, applies to drugs (including biologic drugs) and
medical devices.70 The third, emergency use, is available in declared

64. See id. at 119–22 (discussing market exclusivity designations).
65. See id. at 115–16 (discussing priority review).
66. See id. at 117–19 (discussing application assistance designations but describing them
as “review assistance designations”).
67. See id. at 119–22 (discussing orphan drug designation, qualified infectious disease
product (QIDP) designation, and competitive generic therapy (CGT) designation). QIDP
designation also includes review clock and application assistance elements, see id. at 121, CGT
designation also includes some application assistance elements, see id. at 121–22. On
designated new animal drugs for minor use and minor species, see generally Designation of
New Animal Drugs for Minor Uses and Minor Species, 72 Fed. Reg. 41,010, 41,010–11 (July
26, 2007), which promulgates regulations mandated by FFDCA § 573, 21 U.S.C. § 360ccc-2,
and codifies those regulations at 21 C.F.R. pt. 516(B) (2021).
68. Each is discussed in more detail in MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 125–39.
69. Id. at 125.
70. See id. at 131–33.
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emergencies.71 Such emergencies can include both natural events and
chemical, biological, or nuclear attacks. 72 Emergency use applies to drugs
(including biologic drugs), animal drugs, and medical devices. 73 The
fourth, right-to-try access, permits drug sponsors to provide investigational
drugs directly to patients, for treatment use, in certain limited circumstances.
It applies only to drugs (including biologic drugs).74
71. Emergency use has played a central role in the FDA’s response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Most prominently, the FDA has now approved several vaccines for emergency
use. Two of those vaccines have since received a biologics license through the appropriate
paradigm pathway. See Press Release, FDA, Coronavirus (COVID-19) Update: FDA Takes
Key Action by Approving Second COVID-19 Vaccine (Jan. 31, 2022), https://www.fda.gov
/news-events/press-announcements/coronavirus-covid-19-update-fda-takes-key-actionapproving-second-covid-19-vaccine. The FDA has also authorized emergency use of
numerous other drugs and devices, ranging from tests to therapeutics. Some of these have
been low profile, others have generated national headlines. For a thoughtful summary, see
generally NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.’S
EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE PAST TO GUIDE THE
FUTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP IN BRIEF (2021); and Efthimios Parasidis, Micah L.
Berman & Patrica J. Zettler, Assessing COVID-19 Emergency Use Authorizations, 76 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 441 (2021), which assesses the COVID-19 emergency use authorizations (EUAs) issued
between February 4, 2020, and March 8, 2021.
There is not space in this Article to address the important question of whether the FDA’s
issuance of EUAs at a broad level during the COVID-19 pandemic will result in a future
relaxation of the FDA’s existing marketing authorization standards. Activist pressure to do so
seems highly likely. Whether such efforts will be successful, and the form such success would
take, are hard to predict. In the language of this Article, one possible outcome would be the
development of one or more alternate pathways modeled on the standards actually applied by
the FDA in its major EUA decisions. (As the agency was careful to document, the FDA chose
to apply standards substantially higher than required by the relevant statutory language to some
of these EUAs. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EMERGENCY USE
AUTHORIZATION FOR VACCINES TO PREVENT COVID-19, at 3–4 (Oct. 2020)).
72. See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 133–34.
73. See id. at 133–38.
74. See FFDCA § 561B, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a; Right to Try, U.S. FOOD & DRUG,
https://www.fda.gov/patients/learn-about-expanded-access-and-other-treatmentoptions/right-try (last visited Aug. 16, 2022). Right to try access differs from expanded access
in several ways. Many of these come from the different statutory provisions on which the two
programs are based. Compare FFDCA § 561, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (expanded access), with
FFDCA § 561B, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a (right to try access). The most significant is that right
to try access bypasses the FDA entirely. The agency has no role in the sponsor’s decision to
grant or deny access to a particular patient. See Right to Try, supra (“FDA does not review or
approve requests for Right to Try Act use. FDA’s role is limited to receipt and posting of
certain information submitted under the Right to Try Act.”); see also GROSSMAN, supra note
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For a chart summarizing the means of access to FDA-regulated products
before marketing authorization, see Appendix C.
II.

CONTRIBUTIONS

The framework set forth here makes four primary contributions. First, it
provides a basic terminology based on functional characteristics of the relevant
pathways and designations.75 Second, it suggests that the “paradigms and
alternatives” structure that can be observed at the FDA has developed, in part,
to manage the tradeoff between Type I and Type II error in the FDA’s
marketing authorization decisions.76 Third, it suggests that there are substantive
consequences to assigning particular government functions to one agency rather
than another.77 Fourth, it highlights the role of a newly identified phenomenon,
IPL, in the FDA’s marketing authorization programs.78 These four
contributions are each discussed in more detail below.
For each contribution, the discussion below is necessarily a rough sketch
suggesting possibilities for future work.79 The intent is to demonstrate the value
of the framework as a foundation for future analysis.
13, at 198 (highlighting absence of an FDA role in right to try access decisions as a “stark
contrast” with the FDA’s expanded access program); PARADISE, supra note 21, at 64–66
(discussing differences between expanded access and right to try access).
75. See infra Part II.A.
76. See infra Part II.B.
77. See infra Part II.C.
78. See infra Part II.D.
79. Full development of the implications sketched in Parts II.B through II.D would
require space beyond that available in this Article.
In Part II.B, this Article does not claim that the “paradigms and alternatives” structure was
a conscious design choice tied to Type I and Type II error. Instead, it limits its claim to suggesting
that the “paradigms and alternatives” structure provides a plausible functional explanation for
important aspects of existing marketing authorization programs. In particular, it provides a plausible
explanation for why paradigm pathways have remained largely untouched once established, despite
intense legislative innovation with respect to the various alternatives to the paradigm pathways
(alternate pathways, designations, and means of access before marketing authorization).
In Part II.C, this Article does not claim to establish either that programs located within a
single agency will always influence each other, or that such influence has taken place within the
FDA. Instead, it suggests that striking similarities between FDA programs for highly disparate
product categories make such influence seem plausible within the FDA itself. If such influence does
occur within the FDA, that suggests a similar effect is possible within other agencies as well.
In Part II.D, this Article does not claim to establish that Congress, the FDA, or
individual decisionmakers within either entity, intentionally uses parts of existing programs as
“interchangeable parts” in developing other programs. Establishing such a claim would
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A. Functional Terminology
The framework’s first contribution is a functional terminology for analysis
of the FDA’s marketing authorization programs. In legal analysis, it is not
unusual for terminological developments to drive both scholarship and court
decisions. Prominent examples include the distinction between general
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction;80 the distinction between property rules,
liability rules, and inalienability;81 and the distinction between rules and
standards.82 Those distinctions demonstrate the value of terminological
involve legislative history research far beyond what this Article could present. However, this
Article takes the position that: (1) the similarities that exist between marketing authorization
programs for disparate product categories are striking and go far beyond what could be
explained by chance; (2) IPL is a highly plausible explanation for such similarities; and (3) that
more detailed future analysis will reveal that IPL does in fact take place.
80. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966). In 1966, Professors von Mehren and Trautman
proposed a new terminology for analysis of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 1164–66. Civil
Procedure professors have used a version of this terminology to teach personal jurisdiction for
decades, and the article has repeatedly been cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in leading personal
jurisdiction cases. See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014); J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 899, 910 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Asahi Metal Industry Co.
v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 117 n.1 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984); id. at 427 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 205 (1977). In 2011, a former Civil Procedure professor, writing for the Court,
formally adopted the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction as part of U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (Ginsburg, J.).
81. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). In 1972, Professor Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed proposed a distinction between “property rules,” “liability
rules,” and “inalienability” to describe a set of legal relationships found in both property law
and tort law. Id. at 1089, 1092–93. The article was a foundational work in the early law and
economics movement, and its insights helped to generate a large body of related scholarship.
The article was sufficiently influential for the Yale Law Journal to publish a symposium on the
25th anniversary of its publication. See generally Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 YALE L.J. 2081, 2081–2213 (1997).
82. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976). That article itself is considered one of the foundational works in the critical legal studies
movement. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15 (1987). However, the
rule–standard distinction it popularized has been fruitful far beyond the limits of critical legal
studies. Leading figures in the law an economics movement have analyzed the rule–standard
distinction. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
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innovation for legal analysis. Scholars working in related academic disciplines
have made similar observations on the value of functional terminology.83
The framework presented here is based, in part, on terms already used by the
FDA—pathway and designation. Its terminological innovations are to
distinguish between paradigm pathways and alternate pathways and to
distinguish between review clock, application assistance, and market exclusivity
designations. This Article also emphasizes the sharp distinction between
pathways and designations that the FDA’s written materials often obscures.84
Based on these terminological innovations, this Article has proposed a
two-level framework for analysis of marketing authorization programs at
the FDA.85 Viewing the FDA’s marketing authorization programs
through this framework provides a foundation for deeper analysis. 86
Without such a framework, the programs easily become a complex set of
product-specific programs that discourage engagement by nonspecialists.
This complexity can insulate them from critical analysis.
Under this framework, several modes of analysis become apparent.
Within product categories, analysts can compare usage rates and outcomes
between paradigm pathways and alternate pathways. For those pathways
for which designations exists, this comparison can include various
combinations of applicable designations. For example, this suggests a way

LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 (1974) (using the rule–standard framework to conduct an economic analysis
of the level of “precision or specificity” of legal requirements); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621–22 (1992) (positing that the difference between rules
and standards rests entirely on the difference between ex post and ex ante application of law, and
presenting an economic analysis of when each is desirable from the perspective of overall social
welfare). Rules and standards are now the subject of a large, diverse body of legal scholarship. See
generally Adam I. Muchmore, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Regulatory Design, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1321,
1330–32 (2016) (discussing this literature and citing prominent examples).
83. See, e.g., James Mahoney, Knowledge Accumulation in Comparative Historical Research, in
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 131, 134 (James Mahoney &
Dietrich Rueschemeyer eds., 2003) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS] (noting
value of “well specified concepts” and “typologies,” as “[t]hese classification apparatuses enable
analysts to formulate new and useful knowledge that is systematically related to and dependent
on prior knowledge”); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?, in
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 305, 328 (discussing role of “conceptual equivalencies
across political, social, and cultural boundaries” and “highly focused theoretical frameworks” in
providing a foundation, and organizing principle, for further academic work).
84. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
85. See supra Part I setting out this framework in detail).
86. On the importance of shared terminology for analysis across different academic
disciplines, and across methodological “tribe[s]” within disciplines, see PAUL PIERSON,
POLITICS IN TIME 7–8 (2004) (citing COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 83).

ALR 74.3_MUCHMORE_539-594.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

PARADIGMS AND ALTERNATIVES

9/8/2022 4:46 PM

563

of organizing analysis of each product category. 87 These same types of
analysis can be done across different product categories.
In terms of policy, the payoff for such analyses should become clear when
it comes time for Congress, the FDA, and relevant stakeholders to update the
FDA’s regulatory programs. Such conversations occur regularly, as the
automatic sunset provisions within the FDA’s user fee programs tend to
require renegotiation every five years.88 Moreover, when considering how
to regulate new technologies, articulating the possibilities in terms of this
framework can clarify the range of possible options.
A similar analysis could potentially be conducted between the FDA and other
federal agencies, or between the FDA and its foreign counterparts. In The OldNew Division in Risk Regulation, Peter Huber distinguished between two
“[s]tatutory [m]odels” for risk regulation—“screening” for new risks and
“standard-setting” for old risks.89 The FDA has both screening and standardsetting functions, but its marketing authorization functions fall primarily into
Huber’s screening category. It is possible that other agencies with a screening
function may have a similar structure of paradigm and alternate pathways or
may use some combination of pathways and designations. These could be other
federal agencies with product-approval responsibilities. A similar structure could
also exist in agencies in foreign countries—either the FDA’s foreign counterparts
or other foreign agencies with product-approval responsibilities. This Article
does not take a position on whether such parallel structures exist. If they
do, comparison with the FDA’s programs could be fruitful. If they do not,
and the FDA’s marketing authorization structure turns out to be
idiosyncratic, that itself would justify further research into how this
approach developed, and why it persists.
This framework’s value does not depend on adoption by the FDA.
However, the Agency may find this framework useful. One of the FDA’s
87. This could include traditional legal analysis (including analysis of the relationship
between the role of statutes, regulations, and guidance in each pathway) or various types of
empirical analysis. Quantitative empirical analysis might be appropriate for large-volume
pathways, such as new drug applications, abbreviated new drug applications, premarket
approval of medical devices, and the 510(k) pathway. Some significant empirical work in these
areas already exists, and this Article’s framework could perhaps provide an organizing
principle for meta-analysis of this existing work. Qualitative empirical analysis might be more
appropriate for lower volume pathways, such as the Animal Rule for human drugs,
conditional approval for animal drugs, and indexing of unapproved animal drugs.
88. These user fee programs now fund such a large portion of the FDA’s marketing
authorization programs that they are widely considered must-pass legislation. Failing to renew one
of these programs would result in sudden, massive layoffs of FDA reviewers funded by the relevant
user fees—and would create a bottleneck in the relevant set of marketing authorization programs.
89. Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1030–31 (1983).
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major challenges is effective communication with its stakeholders. The
breadth of the FDA’s regulatory mandate means its stakeholders are broadly
distributed and heterogeneous. These include consumers, groups from widely
different industries, academic researchers, Congress, other executive agencies,
state and local governments, and its foreign counterparts. Moreover, many of
the FDA’s regulatory decisions turn on a combination of scientific, technical,
and regulatory expertise that is rarely united in a single individual.
In its communicative efforts, the FDA relies on a combination of rulemaking,
guidance, compliance guides for specific stakeholders (such as small businesses),
website explanations, speeches, and webinars. At times, however, these efforts
blur distinctions that are apparent when presented under the framework set out
in this Article.90 The FDA might find that the framework presented here makes
it easier for the Agency to communicate with its stakeholders.
B. Type I and Type II Error
The framework’s second contribution relates to the core goal of the
FDA’s marketing authorization programs. At a basic level, these
programs developed to manage the tradeoff between Type I and Type II
error in marketing authorization decisions. As in other situations of
decisionmaking under uncertainty, 91 marketing authorization decisions
90. For example, in May 2014, the FDA issued a guidance document seeking to explain
its various expedited programs. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
EXPEDITED PROGRAMS FOR SERIOUS CONDITIONS – DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS (2014) (setting
out what remains the FDA’s most current guidance on this topic). This document presents
accelerated approval (a pathway) sandwiched between two application assistance designations
(fast track and breakthrough therapy) and one review clock designation (priority review). Id.
at 7–8. The result is a document that requires substantial effort and background knowledge
to decode. At other times, the FDA has been more careful to explain that a designation is not
a pathway to market. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS, INCENTIVES, AND PROGRAMS TO SUPPORT THE APPROVAL OF
NEW ANIMAL DRUGS FOR MINOR USES AND FOR MINOR SPECIES 15 (2020). The framework
presented in this Article, however, might make such explanations both easier for the FDA to
convey and easier for stakeholders to understand.
91. As Richard Epstein has argued, the FDA’s marketing authorization decisions involve
decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty. EPSTEIN, supra note 13; see also Richard A.
Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations Should Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009); Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt, supra note 20, at 5; Epstein, The
Case for Field Preemption, supra note 20, at 469. It is not realistically possible for the Agency to
acquire all the information it would like to have before making marketing authorization
decisions. Humans respond heterogeneously to many medical products, so it is not possible
to extrapolate precisely from a study in a smaller group to the broader population of potential
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involve two types of potential error.92 Type I error results when the FDA
authorizes marketing of a product that it should have kept off the
market.93 Type II error results when the FDA keeps a product off the
market when it should have granted marketing authorization. 94
Those designing regulatory programs will seek, to the extent possible,
to minimize both Type I and Type II error. However, in real-world
regulatory programs, there is likely to be some degree of tradeoff between
the two. Efforts to minimize Type I error are likely to increase the risk
of Type II error, while efforts to minimize Type II error are likely to
increase the risk of Type I error.

users. (This is the case even if trials could accurately mimic conditions of actual use—which
few would contend they can.) To obtain all relevant information, the Agency would need to
observe the product in use, over the long term, in the full population of potential users. This,
however, would approximate the patterns of usage that would result from marketing
authorization itself. Whether they would in fact match marketing authorization usage
patterns would depend in part on whether pricing and public confidence matched the
situation that would exist after marketing authorization. Accordingly, it would not be a
sensible thing for the FDA to require before granting marketing authorization.
92. Type I and Type II error statistical concepts used to describe the likelihood of a test
rejecting a null hypothesis. See Lee Kennedy-Shaffer, When the Alpha Is the Omega: P-Values,
“Substantial Evidence,” and the 0.05 Standard at FDA, 72 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 595, 602 (2017) (“A
Type I error occurs when the test rejects the null hypothesis despite the null hypothesis being
true. A Type II error occurs when the test accepts the null hypothesis despite the null
hypothesis being false.”). They have since come to be used, in somewhat modified form, in
academic writing about FDA drug approval decisions. In this context, the FDA makes a Type
I error when it authorizes marketing of a drug that it should have kept off the market, and it
makes a Type II error when it fails to approve a drug that should be on the market. See, e.g.,
EPSTEIN, supra note 13 (using the terms in this sense); Henry Grabowski & Y. Richard Wang,
Do Faster Food and Drug Administration Drug Reviews Adversely Affect Patient Safety? An Analysis of the
1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act, 51 J.L. & ECON. 377, 379 (2008) (similar); Mary K. Olson,
Pharmaceutical Policy Change and the Safety of New Drugs, 45 J.L. & ECON. 615, 618 (2002) (similar).
This usage goes beyond the statistical sense of these error types, as those applying them to
FDA typically use an ex post evaluation of adverse events as a proxy for Type I error. It is
nonetheless a useful way to frame an evaluation of the Agency’s marketing authorization
decisions. While these error types are most frequently applied to the drug and biologic
approval processes, they can also be used with respect to other FDA marketing authorization
processes.
93. See supra note 92.
94. Id.
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The framework described above sets out a “paradigms and alternatives”
structure that can be seen in the FDA’s marketing authorization programs.95
This structure is based on a combination of paradigm pathways and
alternatives to those paradigm pathways. The paradigm pathways developed
to protect against Type I error, while the various alternatives to the paradigm
pathway developed to protect against Type II error.96 These alternatives can
take the form of alternate pathways, designations,97 and means of access before
marketing authorization. These three sets of alternatives each provide a
different way of reducing the risk of Type II error. Figure 2, immediately
below, summarizes this “paradigms and alternatives” structure.
95. On the distinction between this Article’s use of “alternatives” and “alternate
pathways,” see supra note 7.
96. These efforts to reduce Type II error can also be approached from the perspective of
innovation policy. From this perspective, the focus is not the marketing authorization decision
itself. It is, instead, on the downstream effects of the marketing authorization process on
resource allocation decisions made by individuals and companies. In terms of innovation
policy, some alternatives to the paradigm pathway will increase the expected value of
investments in relevant product categories. They do this in various ways. These include: (1)
making it more likely that a product will receive marketing authorization; (2) reducing the
amount of time or resources necessary to obtain marketing authorization; and (3) increasing
the value of a marketing authorization decision through some type of exclusive marketing
period. For example, many alternate pathways and review assistance designations may both
increase the likelihood that a product will receive marketing authorization and reduce the
amount of time or resources necessary to a successful application. Review clock designations
will, on average, result in decisions that are made more quickly than for standard applications.
As demonstrated by vaccines, therapeutics, and tests during the COVID-19 pandemic,
emergency use authorization can at times be a viable route to large-scale (though temporary)
marketing. And market exclusivity designations are designed to provide a financially valuable
period of exclusive marketing.
For other alternatives to the paradigm pathways, the downstream effects on
innovation policy seem less significant. While FDA sometimes permits companies to charge
for standard investigational use or expanded access, the amounts that can be charged—and
the circumstances in which such charges can be made—are limited. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R.
§ 312.8(a)–(b) (setting out criteria under which a sponsor may charge for standard
investigational use of drugs); 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(a), (c) (setting out criteria under which a
sponsor may charge for expanded access to drugs); id. § 312.8(d) (limiting the amount that can
be charged for a drug provided through either standard investigational use or expanded
access); 21 C.F.R. § 812.20(b)(8) (requiring explanation for any circumstance in which a device
is to be sold as part of standard investigational use, including “the amount to be charged and
an explanation of why sale does not constitute commercialization of the device”); 21 C.F.R.
§ 812.36 (limiting the amount for which a device provided through expanded access can be
sold to a “price . . . based on manufacturing and handling costs only”). The Right to Try Act
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FIGURE 2:
THE “PARADIGMS AND ALTERNATIVES” STRUCTURE
Paradigms
Paradigm pathways
(protect against Type I error)
Alternate pathways
Alternatives
Review clock designations
(protect against Type II error)
Application assistance designations
Market exclusivity designations
Standard investigational use
Expanded access
Emergency use
Right to try

The paradigms (the various paradigm pathways) protect against Type I
error by requiring compliance with the most rigorous version of the relevant
marketing authorization standard. The alternatives (alternate pathways,
designations, and means of access before marketing authorization) protect
against Type II error in different ways.
Alternate pathways protect against Type II error by permitting marketing
authorization without meeting the most rigorous version of the applicable

incorporates the investigational drug charging limits by reference. See FFDCA § 561B(b), 21
U.S.C. § 360bbb-0a(b) (requiring that, to be eligible under the right to try act, an
investigational drug must be “in compliance with the applicable requirements set forth in
section[] . . . 312.8(d)(1) of title 21, Code of Federal Regulations”). A charging limit also exists
for one alternate pathway, the humanitarian device exemption (HDE). See FFDCA
§ 520(m)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 360j(m)(3) (providing that, with certain exceptions, devices authorized
under the HDE pathway may not be sold “for an amount that exceeds the costs of research
and development, fabrication, and distribution of the device”). At the margin, the limited
charges permitted in these situations may provide some stimulus to innovation, as they could
partially defray some costs of product development. But these are likely to be less significant,
as a matter of innovation policy, than those alternatives the paradigm pathway that are not
subject to such charging limits.
These alternatives to the paradigm pathway are only one part of the set of innovation
policies Congress has included in the FFDCA. For discussion of some other important
FFDCA innovation policy provisions, see supra note 61.
97. Designations are not themselves pathways to market, and they are at times used with a
paradigm pathway, rather than as an alternative to it. However, it is still useful to speak of them as
alternatives to the paradigm pathway, as they are alternatives to the pathway in its unmodified form.
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marketing authorization standard.98 Overall, the less rigorous requirements
associated with alternate pathways should affect both the number of
applications received and the approval rates for applications received. This
is a straightforward application of positive economics. All other things being
equal, a marketing authorization standard that is less costly to satisfy should
result in two things. First, it should result in regulated parties filing more
applications. Second, it should result in the FDA granting a larger
proportion of the applications it receives.
The three types of designations help protect against the risk of Type II error
in different ways. Review clock designations encourage the FDA to focus review
resources on particular, favored applications.99
Application assistance
designations encourage the FDA to provide active assistance for favored
applications.100 Market exclusivity designations encourage applications by
changing the cost–benefit calculation of potential applicants.101
Finally, means of access before marketing authorization reduce the risk of
Type II error by providing for availability, in limited circumstances, of
products that have not made it through either a paradigm pathway or an
alternate pathway.102
There may be a simple justification for this approach to balancing the risks
of Type I and Type II error. Those involved in designing marketing
authorization processes will themselves be operating under conditions of
uncertainty.103 The participants in this process will rarely be able to predict
with confidence the results of any change to a particular marketing
authorization program.104 In this situation, there is a clear advantage to a
98. If paradigm pathways were the only pathways to exist, fewer products would receive
marketing authorization. Developing the data necessary to satisfy paradigm pathways would
not be cost-justified for many products that have been authorized through alternate pathways.
99. See supra Part I.B (discussing review clock designations).
100. See supra Part I.B (discussing application assistance designations).
101. See supra Part I.B (discussing market exclusivity designations).
102. See supra Part I.B. Like most efforts to protect against Type II error, their byproduct
is some increase in the risk of Type I error. However, the means of access before marketing
authorization have some characteristics that minimize the potential harm from that increase
in the risk of Type I error. Means of access before marketing authorization do this by
minimizing one or more of the following: the number of users who get access before marketing
authorization; the circumstances in which that access is provided; and the time period for
which that access is provided.
103. At a minimum, this group likely includes politicians, civil servants, lobbyists, and
congressional staffers. On the role of uncertainty in regulatory design, see generally
Muchmore, supra note 82.
104. In particular, they may be concerned that an effort to reduce Type II error will go
too far, directly resulting in an excessive increase in Type I error.
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program structured as an alternate pathway, designation, or means of access
before marketing authorization. If unsatisfactory, such a program can simply
be eliminated, returning the relevant marketing authorization program to
something close to the status quo before the change. This is likely to be both
easier to administer, and easier to accomplish politically, than reversing a
substantive change to the standards of the relevant paradigm pathway.105
Further support for this suggestion can be found in the separate, claimsauthorization processes for food and dietary supplements. As noted earlier,
neither food nor dietary supplements are subject to marketing authorization
requirements. However, some label claims for both sets of products are subject
to claims-authorization requirements.106 These are health claims based on
significant scientific agreement (SSA health claims), qualified health claims, and
nutrient content claims.107 Statutory provisions relating to each of these are
found in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s (FFDCA’s) misbranding
provisions, and the FDA authorizes them if it finds them to be truthful and not
misleading.108 For a chart summarizing the FDA-administered claimsauthorization processes for food and dietary supplements, see Appendix D.
105. On the possibility that agencies frequently approach statutory drafting as if they
were working with a set of interchangeable parts, which could each be added or removed, see
supra Part II.B.
106. See generally MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 271–301 (discussing label claims for food
and dietary supplements).
107. The FDA recognizes five primary types of label claims for food and dietary
supplements. MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 274–77. These are the four types of claims listed
above—for which authorization is required—plus structure/function claims. Id. In certain
circumstances, dietary supplements can also claim a benefit relating to a classical nutrient
deficiency disease. Id.
The requirements for structure/function claims depend on whether the product is a
conventional food or a dietary supplement. Id. For conventional food, FDA has no role in
reviewing a structure/function claim before it is made. Id. For a dietary supplement, 21
C.F.R. § 101.93 requires that the “manufacturer, packer, or distributor” notify the FDA “[n]o
later than 30 days” after the first day on which a supplement making such a claim is first
marketed. 21 C.F.R. § 101.93(a)(1).
108. See generally FFDCA § 403(r), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r). For health claims based on
significant scientific agreement (SSA health claims), the FDA requires significant scientific
agreement before it will conclude that the claim is truthful and not misleading. See 21 C.F.R.
pt. 101, Subpart E (setting out requirements for SSA health claims). After several losses in
court, see Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Whitaker v. Thompson, 248 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002), the FDA developed a separate procedure under which it would
exercise enforcement discretion for claims that did not meet the SSA standard, but were
nonetheless truthful and not misleading. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: FDA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF QUALIFIED HEALTH CLAIMS (2006); U.S. FOOD &
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For each of these, the FDA administers only a single claims-authorization
process—there are no alternate processes available and no system of
designations. Moreover, means of access before marketing authorization are
unnecessary because these products are already available—they are not subject
to any marketing authorization requirement. This is a striking difference
between these claims-authorization processes and the marketing authorization
processes discussed earlier. There are no alternatives to the single available
claims-authorization process for any specific product-claim combination.
One plausible explanation for this difference is that Type II error is far
less of a concern for claims-authorization processes than for marketing
authorization processes. At the product level, Type II error does not
exist—no product is kept off the market because of the agency’s failure to
authorize a claim. At the claim level, Type II error simply results in a
failure to add a particular claim to the product label. This is a far less severe
error than a failure to make a product available. Those who are confident
the FDA was wrong can simply buy the product without the claim.
Examining these claims-authorization processes next to the marketing
authorization process addressed in Part I provides additional support for the
theory set out in this section. To recap, the “paradigms and alternatives”
structure seen in the FDA’s marketing authorization processes plausibly
developed as a way to manage the tradeoff between Type I and Type II error.
Paradigm pathways developed to protect against Type I error, while the
three sets of alternatives to the paradigm pathways developed to protect
against Type II error. No such structure is necessary for claimsauthorization processes, as Type II error presents far less cause for concern
when the product itself does not require marketing authorization.
C. The Organization of Government
The framework’s third contribution is to suggest that there are
substantive consequences to assigning particular government functions
to one agency rather than another. As noted earlier, this is the first
Article to examine the FDA’s marketing authorization processes as a
whole. This is distinct from more traditional efforts to analyze individual
regulatory programs or small groups of related programs. 109 Crosscategory analysis suggest that looking at all marketing authorization
programs administered by a single agency can provide a perspective

DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: EVIDENCE-BASED REVIEW SYSTEM
SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF HEALTH CLAIMS (2009).
109. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 13–30.

FOR
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beyond that obtained by separate analysis of each program. 110 This
exercise is relevant to questions about the structure of food and medical
product regulation, both in the United States and in other countries. It
also implicates broader questions of institutional design, such as those
addressed in the literature on the organization of government
functions.111 As David Hyman and William Kovacic have observed,
analyzing the way policy tasks are assigned among agencies raises—in
the public sector context—issues similar to those raised by Ronald
Coase’s The Nature of the Firm.112 The appropriate boundaries of any
individual government agency are not obvious, but they are issues of both
academic interest and public importance.
For example, this Article emphasizes the striking similarities between the
FDA-administered marketing authorization programs in highly disparate
product categories. These similarities suggest that it matters where in a
government a regulatory function is placed. Each of these programs might
have developed differently if Congress had placed it in a different agency.
For clarity of analysis, this Article distinguishes between macro-level and
micro-level organization of agency functions. It uses the term “macro-level
organization of agency functions” to refer to the way policy functions are
allocated among cabinet departments and agencies. It uses the term “microlevel organization of agency functions” to refer to the manner in which an
individual agency structures its own activities. In other words, macro-level
organization of agency functions refers to where policy functions fit on
the entire federal government’s organizational chart. Micro-level
organization of agency functions refers to where policy functions assigned
to an agency fit on that agency’s organizational chart.
Over time, there have been significant changes in the location of
regulatory functions that are today housed within the FDA. The Agency has
been housed within the USDA, the Federal Security Administration, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and today’s

110. This is a complement to, not a substitute for, analysis of each individual program.
111. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters:
Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446 (2014); David A.
Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Competition Agencies with Complex Policy Portfolios: Divide or Conquer?,
CONCURRENCES, no. 1-2013, at 9, 9–10 & n.6 [hereinafter Hyman & Kovacic, Complex Policy
Portfolios] (listing prominent articles addressing issues of agency design by scholars in multiple
academic fields).
112. See Hyman & Kovacic, Complex Policy Portfolios, supra note 111, at 10 (citing Ronald Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 286 (1937)) (“In a rough sense, we are taking a step toward
sketching out the public administration equivalent of Ronald Coase’s Nature of the Firm.”).
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Department of Health and Human Services.113 The FDA has at times
acquired functions from other agencies.114 And Congress and the Executive
have repeatedly made decisions about whether to assign specific regulatory
functions to the FDA,115 to assign them to other agencies, or to split the
relevant authority between the FDA and other agencies.116
The FDA has been a model for many foreign regulatory agencies.117 Its
marketing authorization process for drugs has been especially influential.118
However, even a quick look at other countries suggests that the macrolevel organization used for these functions in the United States does not
exhaust the possibilities for institutional design.
For example, some countries assign regulation of food and medical products
to separate agencies, with numerous variations on this theme.119 Proposals to do
113. Changes in Science, Law and Regulatory Authorities, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fda-history/changes-science-law-and-regulatory-authorities
(Jan. 31, 2018) (describing the FDA’s organizational history).
114. One significant example is the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s
(HEW’s) decision to transfer biologics regulation from the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
to the FDA. See infra notes 155–161 and accompanying text.
115. Examples include the decision to assign radiation control to the FDA in 1968,
Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-602, 82 Stat. 1173
(1968), and tobacco control to the FDA in 2009, Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control and Federal Retirement Reform, Pub. L. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
116. Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302
(June 26, 1986) (dividing responsibility for regulation of agricultural biotechnology between
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the FDA, and the Environmental Protection Agency).
117. CARPENTER, supra note 22, at 686–726 (discussing the FDA’s influence on foreign
regulatory programs).
118. Id. at 696–722 (discussing the influence of the FDA’s marketing authorization
program for drugs in shaping drug regulation programs in other countries).
119. For example, the countries of the United Kingdom divide responsibility for medical
products and food between separate agencies. The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory
Authority is responsible for many of the products that would be regulated as drugs, medical devices,
and biologics in the United States. See About Us, U.K. MED. & HEALTHCARE PRODS. REGUL.
AUTH., https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/medicines-and-healthcare-products-reg
ulatory-agency/about (last visited Aug. 16, 2022). For food, devolution of government functions
has led to a set of devolved responsibilities split between two geographically focused agencies. See
generally Four-Country Working, FOOD STANDARDS AGENCY (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www
.food.gov.uk/about-us/four-country-working. The Food Standards Agency is responsible for food
regulation in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Id. A separate public body, Food Standards
Scotland, is responsible for food regulation in Scotland. Id. On the development of the U.K.
Food Standards Agency, see John Krebs, Establishing a Single, Independent Food Standards Agency:
The United Kingdom’s Experience, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 387 (2004).
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something similar in the United States occur with some frequency, from multiple
political perspectives, and with numerous different structures proposed.120
The framework presented in this Article suggests that there may be
multiple factors that influence the FDA (and its congressional overseers) to
mold its disparate marketing authorization functions into a smaller set of
strikingly similar program types.121 These may include basic efforts to treat
like cases alike, the desire of both agency officials and congressional overseers

At the supra-state level, the European Union divides its drug regulation and food
regulation functions. It assigns drug regulation to the European Medicines Agency (EMA)
and food regulation to the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The EMA is responsible
for “authori[z]ing and monitoring medicines in the EU.” European Medicines Agency (EMA),
EUROPEAN UNION, https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/institutionsand-bodies/institutions-and-bodies-profiles/ema_en (last visited Aug. 16, 2022). The EFSA
“provides independent scientific advice on food-related risks.” European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA), EUROPEAN UNION, https://european-union.europa.eu/institutions-law-budget/
institutions-and-bodies/institutions-and-bodies-profiles/efsa_en (last visited Aug. 16, 2022).
However, aspects of these functions, as well as other functions managed by the FDA in the
United States, are regulated in the European Union at the member-state level. For example,
most medical device regulation in the European Union is conducted at the member-state level,
but the EMA does have a role in some aspects of the regulatory process. See generally Medical
Devices, EUROPEAN UNION, https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/human-regulatory/overview/
medical-devices (last visited Aug. 16, 2022).
120. See generally Richard A. Merrill & Jeffery K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety
Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 115–18 (2000) (cataloging some of the more significant
proposals from 1949 through 1998). For more recent discussions of this and related issues,
see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-212, FOOD SAFETY: EXPERIENCES OF
SEVEN COUNTRIES IN CONSOLIDATING THEIR FOOD SAFETY SYSTEMS (2005); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/T-RCED-99-256, FOOD SAFETY: U.S. NEEDS A SINGLE
AGENCY TO ADMINISTER A UNIFIED, RISK-BASED INSPECTION SYSTEM (1999); Stuart M.
Pape, Paul D. Rubin & Heili Kim, Food Security Would Be Compromised by Combining the Food and
Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture into a Single Food Agency, 59 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 405 (2004); Timothy M. Hammonds, It Is Time to Designate a Single Food Safety Agency, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 427 (2004); and Note, Reforming the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation
Isn’t Enough?, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1345 (2007). While these publications focus on whether (and,
if so, in what agency) food regulation should be consolidated, any such action would have
implications for medical product regulation as well. This would come either from the FDA
acquiring new responsibilities or losing its food-regulation function. As Merrill and Francer
discuss in detail, supra, a decision to move food regulation out of the FDA would require
numerous decisions as to which other programs (such as food additives, color additives, animal
drugs, and dietary supplements) would be moved out of the FDA as well. In other words,
while marketing authorization is not required for food itself, there are numerous food-related
programs where marketing authorization is an important component.
121. See infra Part II.D (discussing numerous examples).
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to rely on administrative structures with which they have experience, and
phenomena such as path dependence and IPL.122
Overall, cross-category analysis suggests that the structure of marketing
authorization programs is influenced by other programs administered by the
same agency and overseen by the same congressional committees.123 While this
Article does not address agency functions beyond marketing authorization, it
seems likely that other agency functions could be subject to similar influences.
This suggests that those considering changes to the macro-level
organization of food and medical product regulation should be sensitive to
the influence of other programs housed within the relevant agencies. Crosscategory analysis does not itself point either in favor of, or against, the
various proposals to change which regulatory functions are located within
the FDA. It does, however, suggest that those proposing change should
consider possible interaction, over time, between different programs
administered by a single agency. It also suggests that moving a program
from one agency to another may be the type of exogenous shock that
could shift a program away from a seemingly path-dependent course.124
D. Interchangeable-Part Lawmaking
The framework’s fourth contribution is to highlight a previously overlooked
phenomenon, IPL. IPL occurs when a government takes a portion of its law
in one subject area and uses it as a model for its own law in another subject
area. It bears some similarity to what comparative lawyers describe as a “legal
transplant,” but it occurs wholly within a single government.
Comparative lawyers use the term “legal transplant” to describe situations
where some part of a legal system in one country becomes a formal part of
the legal system in another country.125 This can be something as large as a
legal tradition,126 as small as an individual legal rule, or something between
122. See infra Part II.D (discussing IPL).
123. On the influence of congressional committee structures on government
programs, see generally Michael Doran, Legislative Organization and Administrative
Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. R EV. 1815 (2011).
124. On the relationship of path dependence theory to the issues addressed in this Article,
see infra notes 188–195 and accompanying text.
125. The classic work on this topic is Alan Watson’s 1974 book, Legal Transplants. See ALAN
WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21–30 (1974) [hereinafter
WATSON 1974]; see also ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 21–30 (2d ed. 1993). For an assessment of the influence of Watson’s book, see John W. Cairns,
Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 637 (2013).
126. See, e.g., WATSON 1974, supra note 125, at 29–30 (discussing transplants of “an entire
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those extremes.127 It can be adopted willingly by the recipient country128 or
imposed by an outside power.129 Willing adoption can take place through
any method recognized by the recipient legal system. Methods recognized
by many legal systems include legislative action, judicial decision, executive
action, or constitutional revision. Comparative lawyers focus on legal
transplants that occur between countries. There are, however, related
phenomena that do not quite merit the transplant term.130
For example, in addition to the traditional legal transplant, there is the
“transplantation” of law that takes place between sister states of a federal
system. This can take place when one state adopts a sister state’s approach
to a particular area of law. This is a natural outcome of the idea that
individual states serve as laboratories of democracy, free to choose their own
approaches or follow the lead of another state. This can also take place when
a new state is admitted to a federal union, and that state’s constitutiondrafters duplicate some aspects of the constitutional structures of existing
sister states. As this does not carry as much risk of systemic rejection as
country-to-country transplants, the “legal transplant” metaphor is not
typically used. It is a phenomenon similar to the legal transplant referenced
by comparative lawyers. However, it operates within a federal system.131

legal system or a large portion of it”). On the idea of legal traditions, see generally MARY ANN
GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS:
TEXT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW 33–62 (4th ed. 2014), for a discussion on the
concept of the legal tradition and the role of legal traditions in the study of comparative law. On
the transplantation of entire legal traditions, see generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO
PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS
OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 4–5 (2019) for a description of the spread of the common law
tradition by the British Empire and the civil law tradition by the Continental European empires.
127. For a recent review of academic work on legal transplants, see Toby S. Goldbach,
Why Legal Transplants?, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 583 (2019).
128. Examples include the decision by many countries to adopt corporate laws modeled
on the law of a U.S. state or another country. See, e.g., Katharina Pistora, Yoram Keinan, Jan
Kleinheisterkamp, & Mark D. West, Evolution of Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons
from Six Countries, 18 WORLD BANK RSCH. OBSERVER 89, 97–99 (2003) (discussing six countries
that each took its corporate law as a transplant from a U.S. state or another country).
129. The most prominent example is the decision by the Allied Powers to impose a new
Constitution on Japan following the end of the Second World War.
130. Cf. Nou & Nyarko, supra note 36 (drawing a similar analogy to the legal transplant
literature in formulating their concept of “regulatory diffusion”).
131. If one were searching for surgical metaphors, one could distinguish between
“homologous” legal transplants between nation-states and “autologous” legal transplants
within a federal system. But, while the analogy might be worth observing in a footnote, the
payoff is likely insufficient to justify new terminology.
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There is also another related phenomenon, more distant from the legal
transplant, of interest to comparative lawyers. This occurs when a
government takes a portion of its law in one subject area and uses it as a
model for its own law in another subject area. This is an important
phenomenon, but it is insufficiently disruptive to deserve the transplant
metaphor. Instead, this is a more run-of-the-mill process that fits better
with a metaphor suggesting manufacturing rather than surgery. This
Article accordingly adopts the term IPL to describe situations where a
government takes a portion of its law in one subject area and uses it as a
model for its own law in another subject area. 132
To put this concept in context, international legal transplants have
been an important aspect of comparative law scholarship for decades.
“Transplants” between sister states have been a foundational assumption
of most federal systems and are involved in all situations where one sister
state chooses to adopt an approach to a legal rule pioneered by another
sister state. Most state-level law reform efforts and associated academic
scholarship involve contemplated “transplants” between sister states. IPL,
however, has up to this point been overlooked.
IPL has played a fundamental role in the FDA’s regulatory structure.133
This can be seen through an examination of the pathways and designations
described earlier.134 Congress has rarely cut from new cloth when expanding
the FDA’s marketing authorization role. It has, instead, drawn from existing
marketing authorization programs, building new programs largely, but not
entirely, out of preexisting models in other FDA-regulated fields. These are,
in a sense, “autologous” regulatory transplants—they are transplants of
existing agency programs into different portions of the same agency’s
regulatory portfolio. Congress has occasionally introduced new parts, but
even these tend to be used simply to modify some part of an existing program
that Congress does not wish to move into the new area. As set out further
below, this can be seen from a brief review of congressional passage and
agency implementation of marketing authorization requirements.
The concept of IPL may be particularly important in other situations where
agencies have a role in statutory drafting. These situations may be surprisingly
common. Recent empirical work has demonstrated that agencies have an
132. This can include both situations where IPL occurs within an individual agency (as
discussed in this Part) and situations where IPL involves one agency taking an interchangeable part
from a program or policy developed by another agency. It accordingly includes, but is not limited
to, what Nou and Nyarko term “regulatory diffusion.” See Nou & Nyarko, supra note 37.
133. This Article does not consider whether IPL can be found in other areas of U.S.
federal regulation. This is an important topic for future work.
134. See supra Part I.A (pathways) and Part I.B (designations).
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underappreciated role in drafting statutory text.135 The concept of IPL is also
relevant to recent political science work analyzing text reuse by legislatures.136
Congress first imposed an FDA-administered marketing authorization
requirement, for drug safety, in the FFDCA.137 It imposed this requirement
by defining the term “new drug” in FFDCA § 201(p)138 and imposing this
safety-review requirement on all drugs that were “new” within the meaning
of the § 201(p) definition. When, in 1962, Congress decided that the FDA
should review drugs for efficacy as well as safety, it did this largely by
changing “safe” to “safe and effective” in the new drug definition.139

135. See, e.g., Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in
the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 472–76 (2017); Christopher J. Walker,
Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1387–96 (2017); Ganesh Sitaraman, The
Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 104–05 (2015).
These articles followed a groundbreaking, two-part empirical study of the role of
congressional staff in drafting both text and legislative history. See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons (pts. 1 & 2), 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013), 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014).
Related follow-on work has analyzed the statutory interpretation process within agencies (as
opposed to courts, which have been the traditional subject of academic work on statutory
interpretation). See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L.
REV. 999 (2015) (reporting the results of an empirical survey of the way agency officials
approach statutory interpretation during the rulemaking process); cf. Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency
Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421 (2015).
With respect to FDA specifically, Hutt et al., supra note 15, at 610, observe that a 1967
proposal for granting the FDA a marketing authorization role for medical devices was “drafted
by the FDA’s legislative office, which had consulted with many interest groups.” Id. This
suggests that the FDA has been involved in statutory drafting for at least half a century.
136. See, e.g., Roy Gava, Julien M. Jaquet & Pascal Sciarini, Legislating or Rubber-Stamping?
Assessing Parliament’s Influence on Law-Making with Text Reuse, 60 EUR. J. POL. RES. 175 (2021); Frindolin
Linder, Bruce Desmarais, Matthew Burgess & Eugenia Giraudy, Text as Policy: Measuring Policy
Similarity Through Bill Text Reuse, 48 POL’Y STUD. J. 546 (2018); John Wilkerson, David Smith &
Nicholas Stramp, Tracing the Flow of Policy Ideas in Legislatures: A Text Reuse Approach, 59 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 943 (2015). These political science methodologies have, to this point, had only limited impact
in the law journal literature. A February 22, 2022, search of the Westlaw “Law Reviews and
Journals” database with the search string “text /2 (reuse re-use ‘re use’)” returned only 21 results.
137. While Congress had imposed a marketing authorization requirement for biologics
in 1902, see Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902), the FDA
did not yet exist at that time. On the transfer of biologics regulation from NIH to the FDA
in the 1970s, see infra notes 156–162and accompanying text.
138. FFDCA § 201(p), 21 U.S.C. § 321(p).
139. Drug Amendments of 1962 (Kefauver-Harris Amendments), Pub. L. No. 87-781,
sec. 102(a)(1), § 201(p)(1), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (“Section 201(p)(1) of the [FFDCA] . . . defining
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The 1938 version of FFDCA § 201(p) defined as “new”—and thus subject
to the FDA’s first marketing authorization requirement—all drugs that were
not “generally recognized as safe” (GRAS).140 This is the original source of
the GRAS requirement that is today central to food additives regulation.141
With the 1962 adoption of an efficacy requirement for drugs, the GRAS
concept was no longer sufficient to exempt drugs from marketing
authorization. To avoid qualifying as new—and thus triggering the
marketing authorization requirement—drugs would henceforth need to be
“generally recognized as both safe and effective” (GRASE).142 This is the
origin of the GRASE requirement.
This GRASE requirement was one of two statutory concepts that drove
the FDA’s multi-decade effort to implement the efficacy requirement for
drugs. The other was a statutory requirement that such efficacy be shown
by “substantial evidence” and defining substantial evidence to mean
“evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations.”143 The
the term ‘new drug’, is amended by (A) inserting therein, immediately after the words ‘to
evaluate the safety’, the words ‘and effectiveness’, and (B) inserting therein, immediately after
the words ‘as safe’, the words ‘and effective.’”).
140. FFDCA, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1041–42 (1938) (“The term ‘new drug’
means—(1) Any drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety
of drugs, as safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling thereof . . . .”). A grandfathering provision exempted certain drugs from this “new
drug” definition. Id. at 1042. The exempted drugs were those lawfully marketed under the
Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), so long as they remained
unchanged since the passage of the FFDCA, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
141. See Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, sec. 2, § 201(s), 72
Stat. 1784, 1784 (1958) (promulgating new definition of “food additive” that exempted
substances “generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown through scientific
procedures (or, in the case of a substance used in food prior to January 1, 1958, through either
scientific procedures or experience based on common use in food) to be safe under the
conditions of its intended use” from regulation as food additives).
142. See Kefauver-Harris Amendments, Pub. L. No. 87-781, sec. 102(a)(1),
§ 201(p)(1), 76 Stat. 780, 780–81.
143. Id. sec. 102(a)(1), § 505(d), 76 Stat. at 781 (requiring denial of a new drug application
if the FDA finds that “evaluated on the basis of the information submitted to [the FDA] as
part of the application and any other information before [the FDA] with respect to such drug,
there is a lack of substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
proposed labeling thereof”); id. (“As used in this subsection and subsection (e), the term
‘substantial evidence’ means evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
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GRASE concept was the organizing principle for applying the efficacy
requirement to drugs already on the market at the time the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments became law.144 The FDA’s initial focus was on applying the
GRASE concept to prescription drugs.145 Later, the FDA began a similar
process of applying the GRASE concept to over-the-counter (OTC) drugs.146
This resulted in the development of the OTC monograph system, a process
which governed OTC drugs from the 1970s through today.147
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could
fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or
suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof.”). As part of this implementation, the
FDA promulgated a famously rigorous interpretation of “adequate and well-controlled clinical
investigations.” Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of
Adequate and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250 (May 8, 1970).
The current text of the requirement for adequate and well-controlled investigations for
drugs is found at 21 C.F.R. § 314.126. For consolidated excerpts of most of the
documents referenced in this footnote, see MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 319–24.
144. The FDA did this by subcontracting the first stage of the process to the National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS-NRC). The NAS-NRC was
tasked with making initial determinations as to how likely it was that a drug was generally
recognized as both safe and effective (GRASE). The FDA then used the NAS-NRC
evaluations to determine which drugs it should propose to withdraw from the market unless
those seeking to continue to market the drug came forward with evidence meeting the
substantial evidence of efficacy standard. See Reports of Information for Drug Effectiveness,
31 Fed. Reg. 9426 (July 9, 1966) (announcing NAS-NRC role in implementation of drug
efficacy requirement). The U.S. Supreme Court approved this process in a series of four
decisions—all handed down on the same day—that came to be known as the 1973 quartet.
See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 324–25. The four cases of the quartet were Weinberger v.
Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); CIBA Corp. v. Weinberger, 412
U.S. 640 (1973); Weinberger v. Bentex Pharm. Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1973); and USV Pharm.
Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973).
145. See Proposal Establishing Rule Making Procedures for Classification, 37 Fed. Reg.
85 (proposed Jan. 5, 1972).
146. See id.; Procedures for Classifying Over-the-Counter Drugs, 37 Fed. Reg. 9464 (May 11, 1972).
147. The OTC monograph system is set to change significantly over the coming years,
as Congress included a major statutory revision in the March 2020 COVID-19 economic
stimulus bill. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No.
116-36, sec. 3851, § 505G, sec. 3852, § 502, sec. 3853, § 586C, H, sec. 3855, 134 Stat. 281,
435–58 (2020). The CARES Act codifies the new statutory structure for OTC drugs primarily
at FFDCA § 505G, 21 U.S.C. § 355h. For an overview, see ELAYNE J. HEISLER, EVELYN P.
BAUMRUCKER, CLIFF BINDER, KRISTEN J. COLELLO, AGATA DABROWSKA, PATRICIA A.
DAVIS ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46334, SELECTED HEALTH PROVISIONS IN TITLE III OF
THE CARES ACT (P.L. 116-136), at 55–59 (2020).
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When Congress chose in 1958 to require marketing authorization for
food additives—and to do so in a manner that left many existing additives
on the market—it adopted the GRAS concept it had introduced in the
1938 FFDCA “drug” definition. 148 Congress then took the original
Delaney Clause, introduced with the regulation of food additives, and
incorporated similar provisions in the regulatory regimes it developed for
color additives in 1960 149 and animal drugs in 1968. 150
In 1968, a broader reform accompanied Congress’s adoption of the justmentioned animal drugs Delaney Clause. In the Animal Drug Amendments,
Congress carved out “animal drugs” as a separate product category.151 The
drug definition, within the FFDCA, explicitly includes both human and animal
drugs.152 To subject some animal-specific drugs to a separate marketing
authorization regime—without removing animal drugs from the “drug”
definition—Congress adopted a technique from the drug-regulation tool bin. It

148. Compare FFDCA, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1041–42 (1938) (“The term
‘new drug’ means—(1) Any drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not
generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested
in the labeling thereof . . . .”), with Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. 85-929, sec.
2 § 201(s), 72 Stat. 1784, 1784 (“The term ‘food additive’ means any substance the intended
use of which results or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its
becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any food . . . , if such
substance is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate its safety, as having been adequately shown through scientific
procedures . . . to be safe under the conditions of its intended use”). This basic structure
remains in place today, with the modification that the “new drug” definition of FFDCA
§ 201(p), 21 U.S.C. § 321(p), has, since 1962, relied on the GRASE concept rather than the
“generally recognized as safe” (GRAS) concept. Compare FFDCA § 201(p), 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)
(excluding GRASE substances from the definition of “new drug”), with FFDCA § 201(s), 21
U.S.C. § 321(s) (excluding GRAS substances from the definition of “food additive”).
149. See Color Additive Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, sec. 103,
§ 706(b)(5)(A),74 Stat. 397, 400 (promulgating a new statutory regime for color additives).
150. See Animal Drug Amendments Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-399, sec. 101(a),
§ 512(a)(1)(H), 82 Stat. 342, 345 (promulgating a new statutory regime for animal drugs).
151. See id. This statute did not modify the drug definition in FFDCA § 201(g), 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(g). Instead, it created a separate definition of “new animal drug” to be codified at
FFDCA § 201(w), 21 U.S.C. § 321(w). See Animal Drug Amendments of 1968, sec. 102,
§ 201(w)–(x), 82 Stat. at 351–52. On the development of animal drugs as a separate product
category, see Lambert, supra note 16, at 277–78.
152. See FFDCA § 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1). This is sensible, as some human drugs
are also used for animals.
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created a separate definition of “new animal drug”153 and excluded items
qualifying as “new animal drug[s]” from the earlier “drug” definition.154 In
setting the marketing authorization standard for animal drugs, Congress
adopted another technique from the drug-regulation tool bin. It turned
again to the statutory concepts of “substantial evidence” of efficacy through
“adequate and well-controlled investigations.”155
A more dramatic example of IPL took place in 1972. This involved a decision
by the HEW156 to move its biologics regulation function from the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) to the FDA. At the time, biologics regulation had
been a function of the NIH and its predecessors for seventy years—first under
the Biologics Control Act of 1902,157 then under the Public Health Services
Act.158 In the early 1970s, congressional and General Accounting Office
(GAO)159 investigations exposed significant problems with the biologics
regulation program then administered by NIH’s Division of Biologics Standards
(DBS).160 Following these revelations, HEW transferred DBS to the FDA, where
it began its new life as the FDA’s new Bureau of Biologics.161 The FDA then

153. See Animal Drug Amendments Act of 1968, 82 Stat. at 351–52 (codified at FFDCA
§ 201(v), 21 U.S.C. § 321(v)).
154. See FFDCA § 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
155. See, e.g., Animal Drug Amendments Act of 1968, 82 Stat. at 345 (codified at FFDCA § 512,
21 U.S.C. § 360b). The structure of FFDCA § 512, 21 U.S.C. § 360b, on new animal drugs, is
strikingly similar to FFDCA § 505, 21 U.S.C. § 355, on new drugs. However, a more detailed
reading reveals substantial differences. In particular, the new animal drugs provision does not require
human clinical trials (for obvious reasons) and focuses less on the safety of the drug for its recipient
(an animal) than on the safety of a human who might later consume the animal or its byproducts.
156. At the time, both the FDA and NIH were housed within HEW. HEW became
today’s Department of Health and Human Services when Congress chose to carve off its
education functions as a separate, cabinet-level Department of Education.
157. See Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1902).
158. See Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944).
159. The General Accounting Office (GAO) was the predecessor to today’s
Government Accountability Office. 100 Years of GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
O FF., https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/hundred-years-of-gao (last visited
Aug. 16, 2022). The name change took place in 2004. Id.
160. See Nicholas Wade, DBS: Agency Contravenes its Own Regulation, SCIENCE 34, 34–35
(1972) (describing congressional and GAO investigations of DBS vaccine regulation); see also
Nicholas Wade, Division of Biologics Standards: Reaping the Whirlwind, SCIENCE 162, 162–64 (1973)
(describing additional DBS problems and some of the litigation that followed). For a recent
discussion of some of the key events and figures involved, see MEREDITH WADMAN, THE
VACCINE RACE 246, 246–52 (2017).
161. See Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 37
Fed. Reg. 12,865 (June 29, 1972).
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began a long process of digesting this new regulatory role.162
By contrast, when Congress imposed a marketing authorization process
for medical devices in 1976, it chose to rely only lightly on IPL. The obvious
area from which to obtain an interchangeable part was drug regulation,
where a marketing authorization regime—requiring a showing of both safety
and efficacy—had been developing since 1962. However, Congress
deliberately chose not to rely heavily on the “drug model.”163 Instead,
Congress used a more permissive marketing authorization standard.164 It
also sought to constrain agency discretion with a highly detailed statute,165 to

162. The FDA first took steps to apply the “drug” provisions of the FFDCA, FFDCA
§ 201(g)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (1970), to biologics. Procedures for Review of Safety,
Effectiveness, and Labeling, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,679 (proposed Aug. 18, 1972). The agency did
this by determining that “all biological products are drugs” under the FFDCA. Id. At the
same time, it began a long process of determining how to apply the statutory efficacy
requirement to biologics, and how that FFDCA requirement would interact with the safety,
purity, and potency applicable to biologics under PHSA § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262. Its later
actions included merging its Bureau of Biologics into its Bureau of Drugs, see Statement of
Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 47 Fed. Reg. 26,913 (June 22, 1982),
and then separating them into today’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER)
and Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). Statement of Organization,
Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,275 (Oct. 15, 1987). These actions
also included merging separate biologics Product License Applications and Establishment
License Applications into a single Biologics License Application, see Biological Products
Regulated Under Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act; Implementation of Biologics
License; Elimination of Establishment License and Product License, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,441
(Oct. 20, 1999), and transferring regulatory responsibility for various biological products
between CBER and CDER. See, e.g., Drug and Biological Product Consolidation, 68 Fed.
Reg. 38,067 (proposed June 26, 2003). For consolidated excerpts of most of the documents
referenced above, see MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 459–66.
163. See Merrill, supra note 26, at 1806 (quotation marks in original omitted); id. 1806–08
(describing some of the background that led to Congress’s decision not to model the deviceregime directly on the drug-regulation regime).
164. Compare FFDCA § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), with FFDCA § 515(c), 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e(c). In addition to this more permissive standard, Congress permitted the FDA to rely on
a broader range of evidence than that permitted for New Drug Applications. See Merrill, supra
note 26, at 1821–23 (noting that Congress used language in the premarket approval provisions
of the Medical Device Amendments permitting the FDA to rely on “evidence that has not been
derived from controlled clinical studies of the sort [Congress] has prescribed for new drugs”).
165. See Merrill, supra note 26, at 1808 (noting that the Medical Device Amendments
“reflected an effort to anticipate and resolve most questions about FDA’s authority and about
the obligations of device makers”). This effort was spectacularly unsuccessful. The FDA
interpreted the statute aggressively, and Congress eventually revised the statute to align more
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structure the regulatory program around device types rather than individual
devices,166 and to develop a system of premarket approval that it hoped
would avoid a set of then-perceived problems with the drug model.167
Congress’s new approach for medical devices experienced some
growing pains. It seems fairly clear that Congress envisioned a system
where, after an initial period of implementation, most medical devices
would be authorized for marketing through the paradigm pathway,
premarket approval. However, the FDA did not take this approach in
implementing the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. 168 Instead, the
FDA based its marketing authorization program around an alternate
pathway, the substantial equivalence process, that the FDA developed
through a fairly aggressive reading of two statutory provisions. 169
The FDA’s decision led to tension between Congress, the GAO, and the FDA
throughout much of the 1980s.170 There were multiple critical GAO reports
and congressional hearings,171 but it became apparent to most involved that the
FDA had insufficient resources to implement a marketing authorization
program for devices that matched the statutory scheme. In 1990, Congress
effectively caved and accepted the FDA’s preferred approach.172 The Safe
Medical Devices Act of 1990 modified the relevant FFDCA provisions to align
better with the marketing authorization program the FDA had developed.173
Yet, despite these growing pains with medical device regulation, Congress
worked primarily from the medical devices toolkit when it granted the FDA
authority over tobacco products.174 Like with medical devices, the FDA’s
closely with the FDA’s approach to medical device regulations. See DEGNAN, supra note 15, at
121–26; Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511.
166. See Merrill, supra note 26, at 1808–10.
167. See id. at 1800, 1811–12 (describing the FDA’s effort to implement the Medical
Device Amendments in a manner that would not mirror the marketing authorization
regime applicable to drugs).
168. The story has been told many times. For a concise version, see generally
DEGNAN , supra note 15, at 114–28.
169. See id. at 121–24. The first was FFDCA § 510(k), 21 U.S.C. § 360. This provision
required medical device establishments to register annually with the FDA, and—almost
incidentally—required those registered to notify the FDA before marketing a new device. The
second was FFDCA § 510(f)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 360(f)(1), which classified those devices that were
not substantially equivalent to preamendments devices into Class III. Id.
170. See DEGNAN, supra note 15, at 124–26.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 126.
173. See id. (describing, among other changes, the addition of § 513(i) to the FFDCA).
174. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), Pub. L. No.
111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
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authority over tobacco products uses a paradigm pathway based on
premarket approval and an alternate pathway based on substantial
equivalence.175 However, the trigger for regulation uses a technique that
combines device-regulation and drug-regulation tools. It is structured as a
newness provision, which at first sounds similar to the statutory definition of
“new drug.”176 However, the provision itself is a date-based grandfathering
provision similar to the one Congress used for medical devices.177
Another major area where Congress has relied on IPL is in its implementation
of user fees to fund the FDA’s marketing authorization programs. Congress first
enacted a user fee program for prescription drugs in 1992.178 It enacted similar
programs for medical devices in 2002,179 animal drugs in 2008,180 generic drugs
in 2012,181 biosimilar and interchangeable biological products in 2012,182 and
OTC drugs in 2020.183 The user fee programs appear unlikely to disappear.
While each has a sunset provision, Congress has chosen to renew the
programs each time they have come up for reauthorization. They now
fund a substantial portion of the FDA’s product-review staff; renewals are
typically described as “must pass” legislation. 184
175. See MUCHMORE, supra note 2, at 102–03, 111–12.
176. FFDCA § 201(p), 21 U.S.C. § 321(p).
177. Compare FFDCA § 910(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 387j(a)(1) (defining new tobacco products
to include “any tobacco product (including those products in test markets) that was not
commercially marketed in the United States as of February 15, 2007”), with FFDCA
§ 513(f)(1)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A), and FFDCA § 515(b)(1)(A), 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A)
(basing certain marketing authorization requirements on whether a device was in commercial
distribution “before May 28, 1976”). On the FDA’s decision to interpret the “as of” language
in the TCA as referring only to products marketed on that specific date, see U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: ESTABLISHING THAT A TOBACCO PRODUCT WAS
COMMERCIALLY MARKETED IN THE UNITED STATES AS OF FEBRUARY 15, 2007, at 3 (2014).
178. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, sec. 103, §§ 735,
736, 106 Stat. 4491.
179. Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-250,
sec. 102, §§ 737, 738, 116 Stat. 1588.
180. Animal Drug User Fee Amendments of 2008, sec. 103, §740(a), Pub. L. No. 110316, sec. 102, § 739, sec. 103, § 740(a), (b)(1)–(3), (c), (g)(3)(A)–(E), (g)(4), sec. 104, § 740(A),
122 Stat. 3509; Animal Generic Drug User Fee Act, Pub. L. No. 110-316, sec. 202, §§ 741,
742, 122 Stat. 3509, 3515 (2008).
181. Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144, sec. 302, §§ 744A,
744B, sec. 303, § 744C, sec. 306, § 502, sec. 307, § 714, sec. 308, § 715, 126 Stat. 1008.
182. Biosimilar User Fee Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 401, sec. 402, §§ 744G,
744H, sec. 403, § 744I, sec. 407, § 735, sec. 408, § 715, 126 Stat. 993, 1026.
183. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, sec. 3851, § 505G, 134 Stat. 281, 435–54 (2020).
184. AGATA BODIE & AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44750, FDA HUMAN
MEDICAL PRODUCT USER FEE PROGRAMS: IN BRIEF 2 (2017).

ALR 74.3_MUCHMORE_539-594.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

PARADIGMS AND ALTERNATIVES

9/8/2022 4:46 PM

585

The foregoing discussion has demonstrated the degree to which many of the
FDA’s regulatory programs are deliberately built from component parts taken
from existing programs. This interchangeable-part structure suggests two things.
First, analysis limited to a single product category will obscure relationships that
are more apparent through the framework developed in this Article. Second, it
is not infrequent for regulatory techniques developed for one product category
to be selected by Congress for insertion elsewhere in the regulatory scheme. This
suggests that existing programs—even small ones—should not be viewed solely
as aspects of their narrow regulatory field. Each one also serves as a potential
model for revision of existing programs or creation of new ones.
Why does such an interchangeable-part structure develop? A full
explanation is beyond the scope of this Article. One likely factor,
however, is tied to the FDA participating in the lawmaking process. 185 Put
simply, FDA officials comfortable with administering specific statutory
language are likely to consider recommending similar language to
Congress for future regulatory programs.
As the empirical work discussed above has demonstrated, the FDA is far
from the only agency in regular dialogue with Congress about possible
revisions to statutory text. Officials at other agencies likely have similar
incentives to use text they are comfortable administering as a basis for
proposed statutory revisions. Accordingly, IPL likely plays a role in many
statutes administered by other agencies as well.
The likely presence of IPL in other substantive fields suggests a number of
directions for future research. One, open to those with detailed knowledge of
specific agency-administered statutes, is a project similar to the one undertaken
in this section. Close reading of statutes administered by other agencies may
reveal similar patterns of IPL. If this is the case, it could establish that IPL plays
a major—and previously unappreciated—role in the creation of statutory text.
A second research direction is open to those comfortable working with large
datasets and computer-assisted language-processing techniques. This approach
could search for IPL across federal law more broadly.186 It could potentially
reveal IPL both within individual agencies and between different agencies.187
Finally, there may be a relationship between IPL and path
dependence theory. In recent decades, legal scholars have used the
concept of path dependence as a partial explanation for the structure of

185. On agency participation in statutory drafting, see supra note 135.
186. Cf. Nou & Nyarko, supra note 36 (analyzing the related concept of “regulatory
diffusion” in rulemaking by U.S. federal agencies over a 20-year period).
187. This type of work could, for example, employ some of the techniques that have been
used by political scientists analyzing text-reuse by legislators. See supra note 136.
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existing institutions. 188 This effort builds on the work of scholars in
related fields, especially those working in economics 189 and political
science.190 Much of this work has focused on the role of path
dependence in a common law system, but some work has also touched
on the role of statutes in path dependence.
IPL may be an important component of the way that path dependence
operates in the FDA’s regulatory programs.191 First, common experience
suggests that the structure of existing regulatory programs provides the
starting point for most discussions of possible reform. Second, the
phenomenon of increasing returns provides an incentive to re-use existing
regulatory techniques where possible, rather than create new ones.192 This
is, in effect, an economy of scope—a cost savings that results from an increase
in the scope, rather than the scale, of a particular undertaking.193 In many
situations, repurposing an existing regulatory technique is likely to be less
expensive than developing a new regulatory technique from scratch.194
188. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in
Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-in-Effects in Law and
Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813 (1998).
189. See, e.g., PIERSON, supra note 86; W. BRIAN ARTHUR, INCREASING RETURNS AND
PATH DEPENDENCE IN THE ECONOMY (1994); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). For economists, a core
concern is whether path dependence leads to lock-in of inefficient institutions. See generally S.
J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
205 (1995) (suggesting that path dependence leads to inefficient institutions less frequently than
has often been suggested). Compare Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 332 (1985) (the classic article on path dependence leading to lock-in of inefficient
institutions), with S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. &
ECON . 1 (1990) (questioning empirical basis of claims in Paul David’s 1985 article).
190. See, e.g., Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000) (suggesting that, in analysis of political institutions, path dependence
provides value even in the absence of any claims of inefficient institutions because it provides
an explanatory perspective that purely functional explanations cannot).
191. Cf. Katerina Linos & Melissa Carlson, Qualitative Methods for Law Review Writing,
84 U. CHI. L. R EV. 213 (2017) (suggesting a need for more detailed analysis of the
methods by which path dependence operates). If IPL is observed in other jurisdictions
or regulatory fields, it could play a similar role in those areas as well.
192. This incentive should apply to both legislatures (in their lawmaking and oversight
roles) and regulators.
193. See John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268
(1981) (describing economies of scope and distinguishing them from economies of scale).
194. A detailed analysis of the role of path dependence and economies of scope is beyond
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CONCLUSION
This Article has set out a framework for analysis of the FDA’s marketing
authorization programs. At the first level, the framework divides the FDA’s
marketing authorization programs into three components: pathways,
designations, and means of access before marketing authorization. At the
second level, the framework distinguishes between two types of pathways
(paradigm and alternate), three types of designations (review clock,
application assistance, and market exclusivity), and four means of access
before marketing authorization (standard investigational use, expanded
access, emergency use, and right-to-try access).
This framework makes four primary contributions. First, it provides a
functional terminology for analysis of the FDA’s marketing authorization
programs. Second, it suggests that the “paradigms and alternatives”
structure that can be seen at the FDA has developed, in part, to manage
the tradeoff between Type I and Type II error in the FDA’s marketing
authorization decisions. Third, it suggests that there are substantive
consequences to assigning particular government functions to one agency
rather than another. Fourth, it highlights the role of a newly identified
phenomenon, IPL, in the FDA’s marketing authorization programs.

the scope of this Article. The claim here is simply that IPL may play a role in the way path
dependence operates. Accordingly, the relationship between IPL, path dependence, and
economies of scope may be a fruitful area for future research.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Pathways Chart
FIGURE 3:
PATHWAYS195
Product
Category
Drug (not
including
biologic drugs)

Paradigm

Alternate

- NDA under FFDCA
§ 505(b)(1)

Device

- PMA under FFDCA
§ 515(c)

- 505(b)(2) application
- ANDA under FFDCA
§ 505(j)
- accelerated approval
under FFDCA § 506(c)
- animal rule under 21
CFR § 314.610
- LPAD under FFDCA
§ 506(c)(1)(A)
- certification process for
“designated medical
gases” under FFDCA
§ 576
- request for inclusion in
OTC monograph under
FFDCA § 505H(b)
- PMN under FFDCA
§ 510(k)
- reclassification, under
FFDCA § 513(e) or
FFDCA § 513(f), to
exempt from PMN
- de novo classification,
under FFDCA § 513(f)(2),
to exempt from PMN
- HDE under FFDCA
§ 520(m)

195. Statutory references in this Figure—as well as the other figures in this Article—are
to the section numbers of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, and the Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No.
78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944), as amended. For a detailed chart providing, for each provision
of the FFDCA, cross references to the corresponding U.S. code provisions, the date each
provision was passed, and the date each was last amended, see ADAM I. MUCHMORE, FOOD
AND DRUG REGULATION: STATUTORY AND REGULATORY SUPPLEMENT 27–56 (2021 ed.).
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Food additive

- FFDCA § 409 food
additives petition

Color additive

- color additive petition
under FFDCA § 721(b)
- NADA under FFDCA
§ 512(b)(1)

Animal drug

9/8/2022 4:46 PM

Tobacco
product

- premarket tobacco
product application under
FFDCA § 910(c)(2)

Biological
product

- biologics license
application under PHSA
§ 351(a)(2)(C)

Combination
product

- pathways based on
primary mode of action,
with consultation with other
relevant FDA offices

589

- GRAS process resulting
in exemption from
definition under FFDCA
§ 201(s)
- FFDCA § 409(h)
notification for certain
food-contact substances
- exemption for food
contact substance as below
threshold of regulation
under 21 C.F.R. § 170.39
N/A
- ANADA under FFDCA
§ 512(b)(2)
- conditional approval
under FFDCA § 571
- indexing under FFDCA
§ 572
- substantial equivalence
pathway under FFDCA
§ 910(a)
- request for exemption
from substantial
equivalence requirement
- biosimilar or
interchangeable
application under PHSA
§ 351(k)
- pathways based on
primary mode of action,
with consultation with
other relevant FDA offices
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Appendix B: Designations Chart
FIGURE 4:

Designation
Type

Review clock

DESIGNATIONS
Designation
PotentiallyName
Eligible
Product
Categories
Priority
Drugs
review
(including
biologic
drugs)

Application
assistance

Fast track

Drugs
(including
biologic
drugs)

Application
assistance

Breakthrough
therapy

Drugs
(including
biologic
drugs)

Benefits

- the FDA has goal of
taking action on
complete application
within 6 months (rather
than the 10-month goal
the FDA has for standard
review)
- extra interaction with
the FDA during review
process (extra meetings,
etc.)
- potential eligibility for
priority review
- potential eligibility for
rolling review
- concerted FDA effort to
expedite development of
drug through enhanced
interaction, detailed
advice, and early
involvement by senior
officials
- potential eligibility for
priority review
- potential eligibility for
rolling review
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Application
assistance

Breakthrough
device

Devices

Application
assistance

Regenerative
medicine
advanced
therapy
(RMAT)

Biologics and
combination
products that
include a
biologic
component,

Application
assistance

Priority
zoonotic
animal drug

Animal drugs

591

- extra interaction with
the FDA, including
review team support and
early involvement of
senior management
- potential to balance
pre-market data with
post-market data
- potential to streamline
clinical trials in various
ways
- expedited review of
manufacturing-process
compliance issues
- all breakthrough
devices qualify for
priority review
- all breakthrough
therapy features
- potential support for
use of accelerated
approval pathway
- if accelerated approval
granted, potential ability
to satisfy post-approval
requirements through
evidence other than
traditional clinical trials
- taking steps to make
clinical trials more
efficient, including steps
that may reduce the
number of animals
needed for trials
- extra interaction with
the FDA, including
review team support and
early involvement of
senior officials
- involving senior officials
in facilitating in crossdisciplinary review
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Market
exclusivity

Orphan drug

Market
exclusivity

Qualified
infectious
disease
product
(QIDP)
Competitive
generic
therapy
(CGT)
Designated
new animal
drug for
minor use or
minor
species

Market
exclusivity

Market
exclusivity
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Drugs
(including
biological
drugs)
Drugs (not
including
biologic
drugs)

7-year market exclusivity

Drugs (not
including
biologic
drugs)
Animal drugs

180 days market
exclusivity

5-years added to certain
other market exclusivity
periods

7 years market exclusivity
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Appendix C: Means of Access Before Marketing Authorization Chart
Figure 5:
MEANS OF ACCESS BEFORE MARKETING AUTHORIZATION
MEANS OF ACCESS
PRODUCT
Expanded Emergency
CATEGORY* Standard
Investigational
Access
Use
Use
Drug
FFDCA
FFDCA
FFDCA
§ 505(i)
§ 561
§ 564
Device
FFDCA § 520(g)
FFDCA
FFDCA
§ 561
§ 564
Food additive
FFDCA
N/A
N/A
§ 409(j)
Color additive FFDCA
N/A
N/A
§ 720(f)
Animal drug
FFDCA
N/A
FFDCA
§ 512(j)
§ 564
Tobacco
FFDCA § 910(g)
N/A
N/A
product
Biological
FFDCA
FFDCA
FFDCA
product
§ 505(i)
§ 561
§ 564
***
Combination
Depends on primary **
product
mode of action:
FFDCA § 505(i) if
drug or biologic
PMOA; FFDCA
§ 520(g) if device
PMOA

Right
to Try
Access
FFDCA
§ 561B
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
FFDCA
§ 561B
N/A

* As no marketing authorization is required for foods, cosmetics, dietary supplements,
human tissues, HCT/Ps regulated solely under PHSA § 361, 42 U.S.C. § 264 (i.e., HCT/Ps
not also regulated as drugs, devices, or combination products), and radiation-emitting
products, those items are not listed on this chart.
** The main expanded access provision of the FFDCA neither expressly addresses nor
expressly excludes combination products. See FFDCA § 561, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (setting out
provisions for expanded access). However, it does authorize expanded access for each of the
product categories that can be constituent parts of combination products (drugs, biologics, and
devices). Id. This may leave some room for the FDA to determine, via rulemaking or guidance,
whether—and, if so, to what extent—expanded access is available for combination products.
*** The main emergency use provision of the FFDCA neither expressly addresses nor
expressly excludes combination products. See FFDCA § 564, 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (setting out
provisions for emergency use). However, it does authorize emergency use for each of the product
categories that can be constituent parts of combination products (drugs, biologics, and devices).
Id. This may leave some room for the FDA to determine, via rulemaking or guidance, whether—
and, if so, to what extent—emergency use authorization is available for combination products.
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Appendix D: Claims-Authorization Processes for Food and Dietary Supplements Chart
Figure 6:
CLAIMS AUTHORIZATION PROCESSES FOR FOOD AND DIETARY
SUPPLEMENTS
Product
Type of Claim
Authorization Process
Category
Food
SSA health claim
Health claim petition
under 21 C.F.R. § 101.70
Qualified health claim
Qualified health claim
petition under May 2006
Guidance
Nutrient content claim
Nutrient content claim
petition under 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.69
Dietary
SSA health claim
Health claim petition
supplement
under 21 C.F.R. § 101.70
Qualified health claim
Qualified health claim
petition under May 2006
Guidance
Nutrient content claim
Nutrient content claim
petition under 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.69
Structure/function claim
Notification under 21
C.F.R. § 101.93

